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In Search of an Established Church 
Teresa M. Bejan* 
INTRODUCTION 
I approach the question guiding this Symposium as a political 
theorist, as well as a historian of political thought.  I approach it, 
too, as an American—albeit one who has lived and taught for many 
years overseas.  The politics of religion in the United States 
fascinates me, personally and professionally.  I am interested above 
all to understand the way in which past ways of thinking and doing 
have affected—and continue to affect—how we think about politics, 
and how we do things politically, today. 
For many political theorists, the question “Is America a 
Christian Nation?” will provoke a straightforward¾“no.”  
Empirically, while a strong majority (65% in 2019) of Americans 
still identify as Christian when asked, that number has declined 
sharply over the past decade.1  At the same time the rise of the 
“Nones,” i.e., those Americans who claim no religious affiliation, 
identified by Robert Putnam and David Campbell in 2010 proceeds 
apace.2  More important than the facts—for political theorists 
anyway—is the theory.  And in theory, the United States of America 
is a liberal democracy, one of many in Europe and the global 
Anglosphere, defined by its commitment to the separation of church 
and state, individual rights, and religious pluralism.  
* Associate Professor of Political Theory, University of Oxford,
teresa.bejan@politics.ox.ac.uk. 
1. In U.S., Decline of Christianity Continues at Rapid Pace, PEW
RESEARCH CTR. (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.pewforum.org/2019/10/17/in-u-s-
decline-of-christianity-continues-at-rapid-pace/ [https://perma.cc/W2ZW-QK 
B6].  
2. See generally ROBERT D. PUTNAM & DAVID E. CAMPBELL, AMERICAN 
GRACE: HOW RELIGION DIVIDES AND UNITES US (2010). 
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The United States is thus, aspirationally at least, a secular 
state.  While the vast majority of Americans in this era and others 
have been Christians, on the national level the state is committed 
to disestablishment—that is, to the absence of public subsidies to 
religion or formal relations between the government and any 
particular church—as well as to observing an impartial “neutrality” 
between the religions of its citizens as far as any accommodations 
or exemptions from generally applicable laws are concerned. 
Indeed, the leading liberal political philosopher of the twentieth 
century, John Rawls, had America in mind as a model when he 
described the challenges facing a nearly “well-ordered” liberal 
society characterized by pluralism in its citizens’ “comprehensive 
doctrines” and an imperfectly “overlapping consensus” among them 
on the political (but not metaphysical) conception of justice 
governing its public institutions.3 
On this view, the formal separation of church and state—
institutionally, symbolically, and above all financially—appears as 
essential in securing the secularism of liberal democracies.  And 
yet, even political theorists admit that this principle has manifested 
very differently in different places.  French secularism, or laïcité, is 
notoriously aggressive, extending even to an intolerance of the 
display of religious symbols by private citizens in public places.4  
Secular liberal democracy looks different in Germany and the 
Netherlands as well, countries in which state-funding and support 
for religion are seen as consistent with secularism, so long as that 
support is not limited to any single denomination.5  And, of course, 
established churches remain alive and well not only among the 
social democracies of Scandinavia,6 but in the United Kingdom, too, 
3. See John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV.
765 (1997) [hereinafter Rawls, Public Reason Revisited], reprinted in JOHN 
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 440, 440, 462, 482 (expanded ed., 2005) [herein-
after RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM]. Rawls disfavored the term “neutrality” in 
his work.  RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra, at 190-91.  
4. Cecile Laborde, Toleration and laicite, in THE CULTURE OF TOLERATION 
IN DIVERSE SOCIETIES 161, 161 (Catriona McKinnon & Dario Castiglione eds., 
2018). 
5. See Tariq Modood, Muslims, Religious Equality and Secularism, in
CONTESTING SECULARISM: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 69, 81-83 (Anders Berg-
Sorensen, ed., 2013). 
6. Sweden and Norway have formally disestablished their national
churches, but the Protestant national church of Denmark remains.  T. R. Reid, 
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where the Churches of England and Scotland and their clergy 
continue to enjoy state funding and privileges not extended to other 
faiths.7  
In her recent book, Liberalism’s Religion, the political theorist 
Cecile Laborde accepts this diversity as consistent with liberal 
egalitarian principles.  Moreover, she denies that state neutrality 
is a necessary—or even plausible—generalization of “the old idea of 
religious nonestablishment” or church-state separation.8  In this, 
she gives ground to liberalism’s critics, above all scholars of critical 
religion like the late Saba Mahmood, Winnifred Sullivan, and 
Stanley Fish.9  These critics argue, inter alia, that not only is the 
liberal presumption of neutrality an insupportable pretense, one 
masking an arbitrary exercise of power, but that the “liberalism” of 
liberal democratic societies is itself a form of hegemonic (if 
submerged) Protestant Christianity, one that demands that all 
other religions recreate themselves in its own image.10  
On this view, liberal democracies like the United States have 
an established religion—namely, Protestantism—even though they 
do not have an established church.  While she rejects this 
conclusion, Laborde agrees with the critics thus far—that many 
liberal political theorists lack imagination when it comes to the 
Church of Sweden Is Thriving on Its Own, WASH. POST (Dec. 29, 2000), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2000/12/29/church-of-swe-
den-is-thriving-on-its-own/2a52605f-40c4-43f6-b1cd-9c16f7b27a4e/ 
[https://perma.cc/SS23-T2ZB] (Sweden); Elin Hofverberg, Norway: State and 
Church Separate After 500 Years, LIBRARY OF CONG. (Feb. 3, 2017), 
https://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/norway-state-and-church-sepa-
rate-after-500-years/ [perma.cc/L7MH-U7PB] (Norway); Religion and Identity, 
DENMARK, https://denmark.dk/people-and-culture/religion [https://perma.cc/
W9CP-N2NK] (last visited Apr. 1, 2021). 
7. See generally THE CHURCH OF SCOTLAND, https://www.churchofscot-
land.org.uk/home [perma.cc/2V9Q-MSJA]; THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND, 
https://www.churchofengland.org/ [perma.cc/65PM-8HK4]. 
8. CECILE LABORDE, LIBERALISM’S RELIGION 19, 69 (2017).
9. See generally SABA MAHMOOD, RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCE IN A SECULAR 
AGE: A MINORITY REPORT (2016); WINNIFRED SULLIVAN, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (new ed. 2018); Stanley Fish, Mission Impossible: Settling 
the Just Bounds between Church and State, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2255 (1997). 
For other works on the topic, see generally TALAL ASAD, FORMATIONS OF THE 
SECULAR: CHRISTIANITY, ISLAM, MODERNITY (2003); ELIZABETH SHAKMAN HURD, 
BEYOND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: THE NEW GLOBAL POLITICS OF RELIGION (2015). 
10. For a survey of these criticisms, see LABORDE, supra note 8, at 19–25.
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variety of practices consistent with their principles.11  She describes 
two societies, “Secularia” and “Divinitia”: the former strictly secular 
in all respects, while the latter formally recognizes one particular 
religion, both in its public symbols and its laws, while protecting 
and providing exemptions for others.12  Laborde concludes that 
“both are legitimate liberal states . . . [and] in practice, liberal 
democratic states exhibit features of both.”13  Her analysis 
suggests, moreover, that liberal objections to the latter are more 
often a reflection of prejudice than principle.  When it comes to the 
question before us, then, Laborde might respond that the United 
States could be a Christian nation, if it wanted to be, without losing 
its liberal democratic character.  
Laborde’s analysis is powerful and, I think, persuasive.14  Still, 
it will leave many Americans uneasy.  Any student coming from the 
United States to study at Oxford, for example, will not be alienated 
by the sacred architecture, which has been copied by many self-
styled temples of learning in her own land.  But the presence of 
Anglican chapels and chaplains at the center of collegiate life in a 
publicly-funded university cannot help but be offensive to American 
mores.  It violates directly the principle of disestablishment—what 
Thomas Jefferson described “as a wall of separation between 
Church & State”—that Americans take to be the sine qua non of 
secular liberalism.15 
Here, Americans can appeal and do, as is our wont, to the First 
Amendment.  In its very first clause (“Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion”16), one finds the rock on 
which our nation failed to build its Church.  While the meaning of 
11. See id. at 19–25.
12. Id. at 151–52.
13. Id. at 152.
14. See Teresa Bejan, Liberalism’s Parish: On Liberalism’s Religion,
SYNDICATE THEOLOGY (2019), https://syndicate.network/symposia/theology 
/liberalisms-religion/ [perma.cc/AX7W-94N7]. 
15. Thomas Jefferson, Draft Reply to the Danbury Baptist Association, 
NAT’L ARCHIVES,  https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-36-02-
0152-0002 [https://perma.cc/E6NA-LKW8] (last visited Apr. 1, 2021).  When 
state support is offered, as in the case of some parochial schools in the United 
States, that support is available to all, not enjoyed as a privilege by any par-
ticular church and its personnel.  See, e.g., Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 
140 S. Ct. 2246, 2261 (2020). 
16. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1.
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the Establishment Clause has been much debated,17 James 
Madison’s draft language on which the final text was based seems 
clear enough: “[t]he civil rights of none shall be abridged on account 
of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be 
established . . . .”18  As the constitutional historian Jack Rakove 
points out, Madison and Jefferson were of one mind in seeing the 
public maintenance of any particular religion or its personnel as a 
violation of the equal right of all citizens to the liberty of conscience, 
by compelling them to support, financially or otherwise, a faith 
contrary to their own.19 
On this view, the quintessentially American answer to the 
question, “Is America a Christian nation?,” must be, doubly¾“no.”  
From its inception, the United States has had no established 
religion, nor any established or national Church.20  There is a well-
known historical narrative shared by political theorists, as well as 
constitutional lawyers and legal historians, that traces this 
disestablishmentarian view of liberty of conscience through 
Jefferson to the first English saint of secular liberalism, John Locke 
(1632–1704).21  Still, others prefer a narrative starting closer to 
home, noting that Roger Williams (c.1603–1683) of Rhode Island 
17. Compare, e.g., Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Estab-
lishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346, 417 (2002) (positing that “an accurate 
account of the intellectual origins of the Establishment Clause does not, and 
cannot, provide a definitive answer to the question of what exactly the Estab-
lishment Clause prohibited then or prohibits now”), and NOAH FELDMAN, 
DIVIDED BY GOD 19–56 (2005) (criticizing both traditional and revisionist histo-
ries of the First Amendment), with Vincent Phillip Muñoz, The Original Mean-
ing of the Establishment Clause and the Impossibility of its Incorporation, 8 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 585, 639 (2006) (arguing that a true commitment to “the orig-
inal meaning of the Establishment Clause requires the disincorporation of the 
provision” to the states). 
18. Donald L. Drakeman, Religion and the Republic: James Madison and
the First Amendment, 25 J. CHURCH & ST. 427, 430 (1983). 
19. See JACK RAKOVE, BEYOND BELIEF, BEYOND CONSCIENCE: THE RADICAL
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION 66–100 (2020). 
20. There were, of course, established churches in some of the original thir-
teen states, including Massachusetts, Muñoz, supra note 17, at 601, 605–06, a 
point I return to below.  
21. E.g., FELDMAN, supra note 17, at 29–31; PHILIP HAMBURGER, 
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 53–55 (2002); cf. Everson v. Bd. of Ed., 330 
U.S. 1, 11–13 (1947) (viewing Jefferson’s participation in the passage of Vir-
ginia’s Bill for Religious Freedom as instructive of the meaning of the First 
Amendment’s religion clauses). 
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used the phrase “wall of separation” more than a century and a half 
before Jefferson.22  The political theorist and law professor Martha 
Nussbaum has elevated Williams as America’s “First Founder” on 
this basis, as well as presenting him as the first in a long line of 
thinkers in a secular liberal tradition culminating in Rawls 
himself.23   
In my first book, Mere Civility: Disagreement and the Limits of 
Toleration, I argued that the self-understanding of American 
liberals like Nussbaum as descendants of Locke and Williams 
reflects a widespread misunderstanding of those thinkers’ actual 
views on religious toleration, as well as the historical process by 
which our peculiar “First Amendment faith” developed.24  In this 
essay, I shall focus more narrowly on the issue of (dis)establishment 
and consider how each of the three thinkers—Williams, Locke, and 
Rawls—identified as pillars of American secular liberalism by 
scholars understood it as a necessary implication (or not) of their 
prior commitments to the separation of church and state. 
I begin by offering an overview of the significance of early 
modern toleration debates for the development of political 
liberalism, before providing a brief survey of the seventeenth-
century historical context within which Anglophone debates about 
disestablishment took place. This was, crucially, an 
establishmentarian context, wherein toleration was figured as a 
problem caused by “dissenting” individuals and congregations, who 
could or could not be “indulged” or “comprehended” by the episcopal 
22. For more on the relationship between Williams and Jefferson and the
“wall of separation,” see generally JOHN M. BARRY, ROGER WILLIAMS AND THE
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN SOUL (2012); DANIEL DREISBACH, THOMAS
JEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE (2002); 
TIMOTHY HALL, SEPARATING CHURCH AND STATE: ROGER WILLIAMS AND
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (1998); ALAN E. JOHNSON, THE FIRST AMERICAN FOUNDER: 
ROGER WILLIAMS AND FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE (2015); Benjamin J. Hertzberg, 
Religion’s Influence on the Wall of Separation: Insights from Roger Williams, 
James Burgh, and Thomas Jefferson, 23 SIGMA J. POL. & INT’L STUD. 1 (2005). 
23. Martha Nussbaum, The First Founder: the American Revolution of
Roger Williams, NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 10, 2008), https://newrepublic.com/arti-
cle/61558/the-first-founder [perma.cc/UA62-M7AS]; see generally MARTHA 
NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S TRADITION OF
RELIGIOUS EQUALITY (2008). 
24. JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH 29–30 (2012) (describing
Americans’ “First Amendment faith”). See generally TERESA M. BEJAN, MERE 
CIVILITY: DISAGREEMENT AND THE LIMITS OF TOLERATION (2017).  
290 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.26:284 
Church of England.25  As we shall see, neither Williams nor Locke 
viewed the problem with establishment as solely—or even 
primarily—a matter of individual liberty of conscience, nor did they 
understand established churches simply as the beneficiaries of 
state-maintenance or financial support, but as properly 
representative and “public” institutions at the heart of the res 
publica.26  The point for both was rather that “National” churches 
like the Church of England encouraged a conflation of civil and 
spiritual communities and their respective standards of 
membership.  This understanding produced counter-intuitive 
consequences for both Locke and Williams when it came to the 
formal, institutional, financial, or symbolic disestablishment of 
public churches, and whether it was or was not a requirement of 
their separationist principles.  
In what follows, I argue that Williams advocated for 
disestablishment in a way recognizable to modern liberals, whereas 
Locke did not.  Still, both saw a continuing place for what we today 
might think of as “established religion” in a tolerant society, even 
in the absence of a state-supported ecclesiastical establishment. 
For Williams, a tolerant society depended on what I call the 
inadvertent establishment of a form of evangelical and sectarian 
Protestantism in its legal regime; for Locke, it required rather the 
informal establishment of an irenic and liberal Protestantism in its 
public (albeit non-governmental) institutions, such as universities. 
In light of this historical analysis, I then turn to modern 
liberalism and its understanding of religious toleration as 
expounded by John Rawls (1921–2002).  I argue that Rawls himself 
was steeped in early modern debates to an underappreciated 
extent, and that this informed a parallel, neglected turn from an 
“evangelical” to an avowedly “irenic” form of liberalism in his 
thought.  I conclude by suggesting that the latter, especially, is 
crucial for understanding American secular liberalism today, which 
functions (aspirationally, at least) not as an established religion, as 
its critics claim, but rather as an established church. 
25. See infra Part III.
26. See infra Parts IV and V; cf. Arash Abizadeh, Publicity, Privacy, and
Religious Toleration in Hobbes’s Leviathan, 10 MOD. INTELL. HIST. 261, 284–91 
(2013) (suggesting that contemporary thinkers recognized a difference between 
public acts by individuals and public institutions with respect to religious tol-
eration). 
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I. HAUNTED BY HISTORY
American jurists and legal historians look largely to the 
Founding generation to understand the meaning of the 
Establishment Clause. They remain generally disinclined to set 
these eighteenth-century debates in their broader historical 
context.  This includes not only the various pre-revolutionary 
church-state arrangements of the British colonies of North 
America, but also the long-running religious conflicts that 
dominated post-Reformation Europe, which produced so many of 
the religious refugees—as well as arguments, concepts, and 
categories—that subsequently travelled to the New World.27  
Indeed, despite the eagerness of constitutional scholars to link 
American disestablishment with the theories of seventeenth-
century thinkers like Williams and Locke, they have shown a 
remarkable disinterest in the English and European debates about 
toleration and religious establishment in which these figures were 
engaged.28 
This scholarly neglect is in stark contrast with the almost 
obsessive attachment to early modernity as the origin of modern 
27. For a welcome corrective, see generally RAKOVE, supra note 19.  For
other excellent revisionist works by historians, see generally CHRIS BENEKE, 
BEYOND TOLERATION: THE RELIGIOUS ORIGINS OF AMERICAN PLURALISM (2006); 
JOHN COFFEY, PERSECUTION AND TOLERATION IN PROTESTANT ENGLAND, 1558–
1689 (2000); EVAN HAEFELI, NEW NETHERLAND AND THE DUTCH ORIGINS OF
AMERICAN RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (2012); BENJAMIN J. KAPLAN, DIVIDED BY FAITH: 
RELIGIOUS CONFLICT AND THE PRACTICE OF TOLERATION IN EARLY MODERN 
EUROPE (2007); ANDREW R. MURPHY, CONSCIENCE AND COMMUNITY: REVISITING 
TOLERATION AND RELIGIOUS DISSENT IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND AND AMERICA
(2001); ANDREW R. MURPHY, LIBERTY, CONSCIENCE, AND TOLERATION: THE
POLITICAL THOUGHT OF WILLIAM PENN (2016); SCOTT SOWERBY, MAKING 
TOLERATION: THE REPEALERS AND THE GLORIOUS REVOLUTION (2013); 
ALEXANDRA WALSHAM, CHARITABLE HATRED: TOLERANCE AND INTOLERANCE IN 
ENGLAND, 1500–1700 (2006).  For another recent exception that adopts a trans-
atlantic perspective, see generally THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO THE FIRST
AMENDMENT AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (Michael D. Breidenbach & Owen Ander-
son eds., 2020). 
28. See, e.g., Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment: The Church-
State Settlement in the Early American Republic, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1385, 
1420–21, 1524–25 (2004) (discussing Locke and Williams’ influence on early 
church-state debate without mention of wider contexts in which their argu-
ments were made).  For instance, Williams published all of his works in London 
during his lifetime, save the anti-Quaker polemic, George Fox Digg’d out of his 
Burrovves (1676), published for a receptive audience in Boston.  See HENRY 
CHUPACK, ROGER WILLIAMS 62 (1969). 
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liberalism among political theorists.  The most striking version of 
the claim comes, fittingly enough, in Rawls’s Political Liberalism: 
“the historical origin of political liberalism (and of liberalism more 
generally) is the Reformation and its aftermath, with the long 
controversies over religious toleration in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries.”29  The story of liberalism as Rawls tells it 
is thus the story of the rise of religious toleration in early modern 
Europe and the gradual realization that political stability did not 
require religious unity—a realization that allowed for the extension 
of the principle of toleration to other forms of difference.30  
This historical narrative is not exactly “Whig.”  Rather, it is a 
refined version of what would become the standard narrative about 
toleration among revisionist historians, including Herbert 
Butterfield, the man who coined the term “Whig History.”31  
According to this narrative, the emergence of toleration in early 
modern Europe was not the inevitable unfolding of a philosophical 
principle of liberal Enlightenment.32  It was not a product of 
principle at all, but rather the result of battle fatigue after a century 
of religious warfare.33  It was, in Butterfield’s words, “a last resort 
for those who often still hated one another, but found it impossible 
to go on fighting.”34   
This revisionist narrative has also been rehearsed by 
liberalism’s critics, for whom it serves as further evidence that 
liberal secularism is both a product and an instrument of 
centralizing state power, Western imperialism, and Protestant 
mission.  For thinkers like Mahmood or Wendy Brown, Locke serves 
29. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 3, at xxiv.
30. See id. at xxvii–xxix (expanding that Rawls’s views on political liberal-
ism not only improve religious toleration but also toleration of other forms of 
difference, including race and gender). 
31. HERBERT BUTTERFIELD, THE WHIG INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 6
(1965); see KEITH C. SEWELL, HERBERT BUTTERFIELD AND THE INTERPRETATION 
OF HISTORY 30–31 (2005) (stating Whig history is the study of the past with 
reference to the present which is altered with historical fallacies put in place 
by those who are the “winners” in the historical context). 
32. See Herbert Butterfield, Toleration in Early Modern Times, 38 J. HIST. 
IDEAS 573, 575–76 (1977). 
33. See id. at 573, 575–78, 580, 584.
34. Id. at 573.  Butterfield further stated, “[i]t was hardly even an ‘idea’
for the most part—just a happening—the sort of thing that happens when no 
choice is left and there is no hope of further struggle being worth while.”  Id. 
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as a sort of villain, and his notorious exclusion of Catholics and 
atheists from toleration in his famous 1689 A Letter Concerning 
Toleration—not to mention his own involvement in supporting 
missionary efforts in the Americas—is a smoking gun.35  For them, 
liberal toleration boils down to a demand that all religions recreate 
themselves in the image of Protestant Christianity (as a belief-
based, individualistic, and voluntaristic creed), which then 
suppresses or excludes all that do not.36 
Of course, neither version of this story will satisfy historians. 
In the last two decades, abundant scholarship has troubled 
Butterfield’s account of the “rise” of toleration, as well as the 
identity of liberalism and Locke’s place within it.  As Duncan Bell 
notes, Locke was only latterly elevated as liberalism’s founding 
father, well into the nineteenth century.37  Moreover, the “rise” of 
toleration after the Reformation (not to mention its “fall” 
beforehand) was hardly straightforward.  To take only one example, 
the 1689 Act of Toleration, identified by Rawls as evidence of the 
principle of liberty of conscience being “largely won” in England,38 
was not an act of toleration at all, but one of “Indulgence” that 
suspended without repealing the existing penal laws mandating 
church attendance, and that only for Trinitarian Protestants.39 
35. See MAHMOOD, supra note 9, at 33, 48–49, 78; WENDY BROWN, 
REGULATING AVERSION: TOLERANCE IN THE AGE OF IDENTITY AND EMPIRE 31–32 
(2006); cf. Fish, supra note 9, at 2269–72 (noting that the omission of a general, 
independent principle of toleration in Locke’s work reveals his reliance on a de 
facto exercise of power over religious minorities). 
36. For other versions of this argument, see John Gray, Pluralism and Tol-
eration in Contemporary Political Philosophy, 48 POL. STUD. 323, 323–25 
(2000); Jakob De Roover & S. N. Balagangadhara, John Locke, Christian Lib-
erty, and the Predicament of Liberal Toleration, 36 POL. THEORY 523, 524–25, 
527, 531–32 (2008).  For recent restatements of the “Protestantization” critique 
in arguments about the limits of Liberalism’s approach to religious insult, see 
Talal Asad, Free Speech, Blasphemy, and Secular Criticism, in IS CRITIQUE 
SECULAR? BLASPHEMY, INJURY, AND FREE SPEECH 14, 17, 34, 47 (2013).  But see 
Andrew F. March, Speech and the Sacred: Does the Defense of Free Speech Rest 
on a Mistake about Religion?, 40 POL. THEORY 319, 320, 322–24, 337–38 (2012). 
37. See Duncan Bell, What is Liberalism?, 42 POL. THEORY 682, 692–93
(2014); cf. HELENA ROSENBLATT, THE LOST HISTORY OF LIBERALISM: FROM
ANCIENT ROME TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY passim (2018) (examining a 
number of other important liberal thinkers). 
38. See JOHN RAWLS, LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
11 (Samuel Freeman ed., 2008). 
39. See infra Part II pp. 298–300.
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Some of the most notorious examples of English intolerance, such 
as the Anti-Catholic Gordon Riots of 1780, were yet to come.40   
So, too, for the critical religion narrative.  Secular liberal 
principles of toleration and liberty of conscience may well have 
originated in majority-Protestant contexts, but “Protestantism” is 
itself a very various phenomenon.41  In Mere Civility, I argued that 
the United States owes its peculiar constellation of individual 
rights to free exercise and expression in the First Amendment to 
the relative density and abundance in the colonies of sectarian 
evangelicals like Roger Williams.42  But this kind of evangelical 
Protestant was never in the majority in England, let alone the 
countries of continental Europe.  The variety of liberal democratic, 
church-state arrangements noted in the introduction similarly 
belies the idea that a single “Protestant” orientation can explain 
their emergence.43  This is true especially with regard to the issue 
of establishment and the persistence of public churches in Europe. 
Furthermore, I agree with Laborde that the fact that some of the 
arrangements preferred by modern liberals originated in particular 
facets of Protestant theology or ecclesiology does not in itself 
disqualify them as inconsistent with liberals’ normative principles 
of liberty and equality.44  Indeed, they would seem rather to enjoy 
a presumption of being at least more consistent than the 
alternatives evidently imagined, if not articulated, by liberalism’s 
critics.45 
Still, the extent to which the language of liberal political theory 
and jurisprudence reveals its early modern origins is remarkable. 
Theorists prefer to use the emphatically early modern coinage of 
“toleration” over “tolerance,” as well as terms like “establishment,” 
40. See, e.g., The Gordon Riots, U.K. NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.nation-
alarchives.gov.uk/pathways/blackhistory/rights/gordon.htm 
[https://perma.cc/VE2U-PN62] (last visited Apr. 1, 2021). 
41. See De Roover & Balagangadhara, supra note 36, at 524–25, 527, 531–
32. But see STUART B. SCHWARTZ, ALL CAN BE SAVED: RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE 
AND SALVATION IN THE IBERIAN ATLANTIC WORLD 225–27, 248 (2008) (noting be-
liefs in toleration and liberty of conscience could be found all over in Spain, the
Caribbean, and South America even though the ideas started out as purely
Protestant).
42. BEJAN, supra note 24, at 167–68, 171–72.
43. See supra Introduction pp. at 285–87.
44. LABORDE, supra note 8, at 16–17.
45. See id.
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“conscience,” and “nonconformity.”  Political philosophers will 
debate how much “latitude” should be granted to “dissent”—and 
disagree about whether claims of conscience should be extended to 
matters that are, strictly speaking, “indifferent.”46  
This early modern technical vocabulary reminds us that 
modern English is itself a product of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries.  But it also betrays the extent to which the language 
political theorists and philosophers use to describe the challenges 
of coexistence under conditions of religious diversity is itself the 
product of a particular ecclesiastical context—namely, that of an 
established church.  Even today, our analytic concepts reflect those 
of the Church of England and its peculiar brand of Protestant 
episcopalianism, as an institution that debated for centuries how 
much “dissent” or disagreement it could accommodate within its 
communion while remaining a unified, properly public Church.47 
II. PAROCHIALISM AND ESTABLISHMENT
Elsewhere, I have noted the persistent conceptual 
parochialism of political theory when it comes to the challenges of 
coexistence under conditions of religious diversity.48  Indeed, the 
term “parochial” is itself illustrative of the general process whereby 
Anglo-Catholic ideas and institutions were reappropriated and 
redeployed by the Tudor state after the Reformation.  As a 
descriptive term, the adjective “parochial” means simply “of or 
belonging to the parish” as a unit of ecclesiastical, and later civil, 
governance.49  Parishes developed in the Middle Ages as small 
territorial units organized around a single church and its minister. 
These units thus enjoyed a well-defined geographic and 
administrative place within the Anglo-Catholic ecclesiastical 
hierarchy.  During the English Reformation, the Tudor monarchy 
effectively nationalized the existing parish systems in order to 
implement the Poor Law and other social policies. 
  Understanding the process whereby the newly “National,” as 
opposed to Catholic or universal, church assumed not only the 
46. Bejan, supra note 14.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.; Parochial, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://www-oed-
com.rwulaw.idm.oclc.org/view/Entry/138040?redirectedFrom=parochial& 
[https://perma.cc/G4J8-Q2QG] [(last visited Apr. 1, 2021). 
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religious—but the administrative, educative, economic, and 
philanthropic—roles and resources of its Anglo-Catholic 
predecessor is crucial in making sense of how the issue of 
establishment presented itself to English Protestants in the 
seventeenth century—including the evangelicals like Roger 
Williams, who emigrated to the New World.  Most of these refugees 
(including the more famous Pilgrims of Plymouth Rock) were also 
Puritans.50 While many Americans will recognize “Puritan” today 
as a pejorative—if not from early American history, then from H.L. 
Mencken’s famous dictum51—few will understand the label’s 
origins.  This name (or, in early modern English, “denomination”) 
was coined as a pejorative in the sixteenth century to describe 
Protestants within the newly Protestant Church of England who 
believed that the work of Reformation had not gone far enough.52  
So-called “Puritans” could not help but notice the ease with 
which the Anglican Church had accommodated itself to Anglo-
Catholic institutions—not only parishes, but episcopacy (that is, 
government by bishops), miters, surplices, kneeling, incense, and 
all the rest—and concluded that the English hierarchy had made 
premature peace with the Whore of Babylon (i.e., Roman 
Catholicism), thereby stopping the godly work of Reformation in its 
tracks.53  Initially, these “Puritans”—while meeting occasionally in 
private prayer and scripture-reading groups called “conventicles”—
were committed to remaining members of the Church of England so 
as to be able to reform it from within.54  But over time, and under 
persecution, some Puritans formally separated from the National 
Church to form their own “dissenting” congregations.55  
50. MICHAEL P. WINSHIP, HOT PROTESTANTS: THE HISTORY OF PURITANISM
IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 71–82 (2018). 
51. A Puritan, Mencken tells us, is someone dominated by the “fear that
someone, somewhere, may be happy.”  H. L. MENCKEN, A MENCKEN 
CHRESTOMATHY 624 (H.L. Mencken ed., First Vintage Books ed., 1982). 
52. See COFFEY, supra note 27, at 93.
53. See id. at 93–94.
54. See KAPLAN, supra note 27, at 141.
55. See William Wallace Fenn, John Robinson’s Farewell Address, 13
HARV. THEOLOGICAL REV. 236, 239–40 (1920).  One such congregation, led by 
John Robinson, fled abroad and settled in Leyden before deciding to remove 
wholesale to the New World.  WINSHIP, supra note 50, at 62.  Although their 
intended destination was Virginia, these so-called “Pilgrims” had to make do 
with Plymouth, Massachusetts when a violent storm blew their ship, the 
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Still, the majority of Puritans remained in England, 
determined to push the established Church towards the purity of 
“primitive” Christianity, from within.  A renewed campaign of 
persecution—led by the unfortunate Charles I and his equally 
unfortunate Archbishop of Canterbury, William Laud—led to 
another wave of religious refugees (including Williams) in the 
1630s.  After this, however, those who stayed behind got their 
chance.56  When the English Civil War broke out in 1642, almost 
the first item on the Long Parliament’s agenda was to abolish 
bishops (finally accomplished in 164657) and “establish” a more 
godly form of Church-government in its place.58  Here, however, the 
Puritans were themselves divided between Presbyterians, who 
wanted to impose Scottish discipline and unity on the English 
Church, and “Independents” or Congregationalists, who wanted 
individual churches to be able to organize themselves and choose 
their own ministers under the umbrella (and watchful eye) of the 
ecclesiastical establishment.  Under the latter system, the National 
Church would act as a centralized regulatory body overseeing the 
training and ordination of clergy.59  Unable to agree, the breakdown 
of negotiations between Presbyterians and Independents led to a de 
facto (albeit limited) toleration under Oliver Cromwell during the 
Interregnum.60  
The episcopal Church of England—which still exists to this 
day—would be fully reestablished along with the monarchy in 
1660,61 after which it quickly got down to the business of cracking 
down on dissent.  It pursued this persecutory program with the 
support of Parliament until the so-called “Toleration Act” of 1689 
Mayflower, off course.  See id. at 71–72.  For a first-hand account, see generally 
WILLIAM BRADFORD, OF PLYMOUTH PLANTATION, 1620–1647 (Henry Wish ed., 
Capricorn Books 1962) (1912). 
56. See RAKOVE, supra note 19, at 27.
57. Marcus Harmes, The Universality of Discipline: Restoration of the Eng-
lish Episcopacy, 1660–1688, 33 RENAISSANCE & REFORM 55, 59 (2010). 
58. See COFFEY, supra note 27, at 135–36.
59. See RAKOVE, supra note 19, at 27.
60. See COFFEY, supra note 27, at 147–48; cf. Blair Worden, Toleration and
the Cromwellian Protectorate, in PERSECUTION AND TOLERATION 199, 227 (W. J. 
Sheils ed., 1984) (during the close of the Interregnum, toleration was provided 
to some sects of “peaceable dissenters,” yet still it was still forbidden to blas-
pheme, particularly by espousing any anti-trinitarian doctrines). 
61. RAKOVE, supra note 19, at 28.
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broke its monopoly on public worship for good.62  As Rakove notes, 
persecution by the re-established Church came in predominately 
two forms: penal laws and Test Acts.63  The former imposed steep 
fines, and even imprisonment, for non-attendance at public 
worship, while also banning conventicles—defined as private 
religious meetings of over five persons beyond immediate 
family64—altogether.65  Test Acts were designed, in turn, to exclude 
“nonconformists,” or those who would not take communion in an 
established church (above all, Catholics) or swear oaths (above all, 
Quakers) by imposing these as preconditions for participating in 
public office and in the courts.66  
This was the legal regime and political context in which the 
question of religious toleration came to the forefront of public 
debate in England once again in the latter part of the seventeenth 
century.  Proponents of toleration generally had two main policy 
options in view.  The first, known as “indulgence,” proposed to 
repeal or suspend the penal laws punishing dissent, and thus accept 
(at least informally) the existence of multiple churches alongside 
the National Church.67  The second, known as “comprehension” or 
“latitude,” was an irenic (literally, peace-seeking) policy that 
proposed to accommodate diversity within the established Church 
through creedal minimalism and sacramental inclusiveness.68  By 
paring back theological orthodoxy on so-called “indifferent” matters 
(adiaphora) in favor of the “fundamentals” (fundamenta) of 
Christianity, those known as “latitudinarians” within the Church 
of England hoped to be able to welcome dissenters back into the 
fold.69  Although it is largely forgotten today, the historian 
62. See SOWERBY, supra note 27, at 250.
63. RAKOVE, supra note 19, at 29.
64. RICHARD LODGE, 8 THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND: FROM THE RESTORATION 
TO THE DEATH OF WILLIAM III, 1660–1702, at 69 (1910). 
65. RAKOVE, supra note 19, at 29.
66. See id. at 29–30
67. See id. at 29–31.
68. See Mark Goldie, John Locke, Jonas Proast, and Religious Toleration:
1688-1692, in THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND: 1689–1833, 143, 160–61, 164 (John 
Walsh et al., eds., 1993); SOWERBY, supra note 27, at 58, 174–75. 
69. See Mark Goldie, The Theory of Religious Intolerance in Restoration
England, in FROM PERSECUTION TO TOLERATION: THE GLORIOUS REVOLUTION 
AND RELIGION IN ENGLAND 331, 332–33, 354 (Ole Peter Grell et al. eds., 1991); 
see also Goldie, supra note 69, at 161, 164. 
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Benjamin Kaplan argues that comprehension was thus “the most 
ambitious and charitable of all forms [of toleration], requiring a 
genuine acceptance of beliefs different from one’s own as valid and 
a willingness to take Holy Communion with those who maintained 
them.”70 
Recognizing that there were two forms of toleration on offer in 
the seventeenth century complicates the familiar liberal story that 
recounts its ineluctable “rise.”  Firstly, it reveals that the chief 
proponents of accommodating religious diversity outside of the 
established Church were not enlightened Whig statesmen in 
Parliament, but rather the absolutist, crypto-Catholic Stuart 
monarchs, Charles II and James II, both of whom issued 
“Declarations of Indulgence” over Parliament’s objection and 
canvassed for the repeal of its persecutory statutes.71  Secondly, it 
reminds us that the Parliamentary Act of Toleration, enacted after 
James II was expelled and replaced by his daughter, Mary, and her 
safely Protestant husband, William of Orange, was rather a 
statutory indulgence and was meant to be accompanied by a 
complementary Act of Comprehension, which failed to pass.72 
Actually called “An Act for Exempting their Majestyes Protestant 
Subjects dissenting from the Church of England from the Penalties 
of certaine Lawes” (1688, enacted 1689), the Toleration Act 
suspended but did not repeal the penal laws prosecuting any 
religious activity by Trinitarian Protestants outside of the 
established Church.73  Catholics, Quakers, and Unitarians would 
remain out of luck, and the Test Acts targeting them directly 
remained on the books well into the nineteenth century.74 
Needless to say, neither form of toleration on offer in the 
seventeenth century proposed to disestablish the established 
Church of England, nor did dissenters argue that their liberty of 
70. KAPLAN, supra note 27, at 133.
71. See SOWERBY, supra note 27, at 24, 29, 58.  James II also sponsored the
colonial experiment in religious diversity known as Pennsylvania, conducted 
by his close friend (and Quaker) William Penn.  See id. at 40. 
72. Id. at 249–55.
73. See generally An Act for Exempting their Majestyes Protestant Sub-
jects dissenting from the Church of England from the Penalties of certaine 
Lawes 1689, 1 W. & M. c. 18 (Eng.), http://www.british-history.ac.uk/statutes-
realm/vol6/pp74-76 [perma.cc/YMZ4-S9A7]. 
74. See KAPLAN, supra note 27, at 141.
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conscience demanded disestablishment in the form of defunding the 
Church or abolishing its political, legal, economic, or symbolic 
privileges.  Rather, both forms of toleration (indulgence as well as 
comprehension) presupposed the continued existence of an 
established Church.  While the grounds on which religious 
uniformity and a National Church were defended as essential 
shifted over time—with secular concerns about the economic and 
geopolitical benefits of Protestant unity eventually overtaking 
salvific ones—eighteenth-century Whigs and Tories were generally 
agreed in viewing the Church of England as an important part of 
the English Constitution, although they disagreed on just how 
essential a part it was.75  For example, in her 1704 pamphlet 
Moderation Truly Stated, the Tory polemicist and feminist Mary 
Astell inveighed against the practice of “Occasional Conformity”—
whereby dissenters took occasional communion in the Church of 
England so as to be able to seek office—because it allowed 
hypocritical Whigs who were not true “Friends to the Constitution” 
to stand for public office. 76 
Certainly, there were many critics of the established Church of 
England as it existed after the Restoration, and these critics would 
grow louder over time.77  In the late eighteenth century, Unitarian 
ministers and theologians like Richard Price (1723–1791) and 
Joseph Priestley (1733–1804) would begin to argue—with one eye 
on the American colonies—that coercive taxation in support of the 
religious establishment was itself a violation of dissenters’ liberty 
of conscience.78  But those who criticized the episcopal 
establishment as bloated, as well as bigoted, were not generally 
motivated by conscience.  For example, the inventor of “political 
75. See Mark Knights, ‘Meer Religion’ and the ‘church-state’ of Restoration
England: the impact and ideology of James II’s declarations of indulgence, in 
A NATION TRANSFORMED: ENGLAND AFTER THE RESTORATION 41, 41–42 (Alan 
Craig Houston & Steve C. A. Pincus eds., 2001). 
76. See MARY ASTELL, MODERATION TRULY STATED, at xlii (1704); see also
Mark Goldie, Mary Astell and John Locke, in MARY ASTELL: REASON, GENDER, 
FAITH 65, 75 (William Kolbrener & Michal Michelson eds., 2007). 
77. See generally J.A.I. CHAMPION, THE PILLARS OF PRIESTCRAFT SHAKEN: 
THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND AND ITS ENEMIES, 1660–1730 (1992). 
78. See generally JOSEPH PRIESTLEY, AN ESSAY ON THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF
GOVERNMENT AND ON THE NATURE OF POLITICAL, CIVIL, AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
(2d ed. 1771); RICHARD PRICE, OBSERVATIONS ON THE NATURE OF CIVIL LIBERTY, 
THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT, AND THE JUSTICE AND POLICY OF THE WAR WITH
AMERICA (9th ed. 1776). 
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arithmetic,” Sir William Petty (1623–1687) argued that the clergy 
should be saddled with additional duties—including census-taking, 
maintaining public records, acting as notaries, inspecting schools, 
and delivering the post—in order to justify their cost.79  Beyond 
overseeing public worship and maintaining church buildings, the 
Church of England would remain responsible for overseeing much 
of public education and poor relief in England well into the 
nineteenth century.80  And even as their influence and enforcement 
in the political sphere waned, religious tests remained in force in 
British Universities, which continued to operate as they had for 
centuries, as key credentialing bodies for the Anglican clergy.81 
Nevertheless, dissenters did not seek to defund the Universities, 
but rather founded their own Dissenting Academies.82 
With this thoroughly establishmentarian context in mind, let 
us turn now to the seventeenth-century thinkers still claimed today 
as founding figures in America’s tradition of secular liberalism and 
consider how they viewed the issue of establishment.  As we shall 
see, the arguments offered by Roger Williams and John Locke 
differed greatly; neither were what modern liberals might expect. 
III. THE LATRINE OF NEW ENGLAND
Given their continuing fascination with early modern 
toleration debates, political theorists’ comparative lack of interest 
in the early American experiments with religious coexistence 
conducted by erstwhile dissenters from the Anglican Church like 
Roger Williams and William Penn is surprising.  For example, 
Rainer Forst’s magisterial tome, Toleration in Conflict, runs over 
600 pages and surveys such relatively obscure figures in the history 
of toleration as Raymond Llull en route to Rawls, but barely 
79. See 1 WILLIAM PETTY, THE PETTY PAPERS 141–43 (Henry Petty-Fitz-
maurice ed., 1927).  I am grateful to Shannon Stimson for bringing Petty’s com-
plaints to my attention.  See generally Shannon Stimson, Heterodoxy and Po-
litical Economy in Sir William Petty (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the 
author). 
80. See James Murphy, Religion, the State, and Education in England, 8
HIST. EDUC. Q. 3, 8–10, 28 (1968). 
81. See id. at 28.
82. See IRENE PARKER, DISSENTING ACADEMIES IN ENGLAND: THEIR RISE AND
PROGRESS AND THEIR PLACE AMONG THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEMS OF THE COUNTRY 
46–50 (1914). 
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considers the “lively experiments” conducted in Rhode Island and 
Pennsylvania.83 
Nevertheless, the role played by English dissenters in the 
colonies of British North America has long loomed large in the self-
understanding of Americans.84  In 1835, Alexis de Tocqueville 
famously claimed to “see the destiny of America imbodied in the 
first puritan who landed on those shores, just as the human race 
was represented by the first man.”85  Yet in crediting the Pilgrims 
of Plymouth Colony as the “Founders” of American democracy, 
Tocqueville was repurposing a popular domestic trope for an 
international audience.86  As described by the historian Sarah 
Morgan Smith in honor of its 400th anniversary, the Mayflower 
Compact (1620)—signed by the Puritan separatists attempting to 
emigrate, unsuccessfully, from Holland to Virginia, as well as the 
non-Puritan “strangers” in their midst—marked the arrival of “the 
principle of religious toleration in America.”87  
Of course, the cultural emphasis on the Pilgrims and the other 
“Christian Utopian Closed Corporate Communit[ies]” of Puritans 
that came to New England and settled in their wake, neglects the 
English colonists who came before them.88  Indeed, by the time the 
83. See generally RAINER FORST, TOLERATION IN CONFLICT (2013).  When
Forst discusses Williams and Penn, it is exclusively in their English contexts. 
Teresa M. Bejan, What’s the use? Rainer Forst and the history of toleration, in 
TOLERATION, POWER AND THE RIGHT TO JUSTIFICATION: RAINER FORST IN 
DIALOGUE 23, 33–34 (Daniel Owen ed., 2020); see FORST, supra, at 182–85, 206–
08. 
84. See generally BERNARD BAILYN, THE BARBAROUS YEARS: THE PEOPLING 
OF BRITISH NORTH AMERICA: THE CONFLICT OF CIVILIZATIONS, 1600–1675 (2012). 
85. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 318 (Henry Reeve
trans., 4th ed. 1841). 
86. See Sanford Kessler, Tocqueville’s Puritans: Christianity and the
American Founding, 54 J. POL. 776, 789–91 (1992); cf. Rufus Choate, The Age 
of the Pilgrims: The Heroic Period of our History, Address to the New England 
Association (1843), in 1 THE NEW ENGLAND SOCIETY ORATIONS 325, 325–26 
(Cephas Brainerd & Eveline Warner Brainerd eds., 1901) (asserting that 
Americans are “the children of the Pilgrims”).  
87. Sarah Morgan Smith, ‘To Covenant and Combine Ourselves into a Civil
Body Politic’: The Mayflower Compact @ 400 Years, ONLINE LIBRARY OF LIBERTY
(May 2020), https://oll.libertyfund.org/pages/lm-smith-1620 [https://perma.
cc/UQ2W-LRAR].  
88. Cf. KENNETH A. LOCKRIDGE, A NEW ENGLAND TOWN THE FIRST
HUNDRED YEARS: DEDHAM, MASSACHUSETTS, 1636–1736, at 16–17, 165 (1970) 
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Pilgrims arrived in Plymouth, the episcopal Church of England had 
already been established in Virginia.89  While the ill-fated Roanoke 
Colony had disappeared by 1590, Jamestown limped along from 
1607.90  The contemporary Popham Colony in Maine packed up 
after only a year.91  Nor were the Pilgrims the first English settlers 
to be blown off course.  The 1609 shipwreck that inspired 
Shakespeare’s Tempest led to the settlement of Bermuda or 
“Somers Isles” by English sailors.92  In 1612, the Bermudans even 
signed a “compact” of their own, before the third and final Virginia 
Charter brought the islands formally under Company control.93 
This “Bermuda Compact,” if you will, began by declaring 
subscribers’ fidelity to the Church of England and hostility to its 
“dissenting” enemies: “all Atheists[,] Papists, Anabaptists, 
Brownists”—i.e., separatist congregationalists like the Pilgrims 
themselves—“and all other Heretiques and Sectaries whatsoever, 
dissenting from the said [Anglican] Word and Faith.”94  
(focusing on puritan origins of a New England town and casting its history as 
illustrative of “much of early America”). 
89. William H. Seiler, The Church of England as the Established Church
in Seventeenth-Century Virginia, 15 J. SOUTHERN HIST. 478, 482 (1949). 
90. See generally KATHLEEN DONEGAN, SEASONS OF MISERY: CATASTROPHE 
AND COLONIAL SETTLEMENT IN EARLY AMERICA, 21–116 (2014). 
91. Christopher J. Bilodeau, The Paradox of Sagadahoc: The Popham Col-
ony, 1607–1608, 12 EARLY AM. STUD. 1, 1 (2014). 
92. Charles Frey, The Tempest and the New World, 30 Shakespeare Q. 29,
29 (1979) (examining the influence of new world settlement on Shakespeare’s 
play); J. Maxwell Greene, Bermuda (alias Somers Islands).  Historical Sketch, 
33 BULL. AM. GEOGRAPHICAL SOC’Y 220, 223–26 (1901) (charting early English 
settlement of Bermuda). 
93. J.S. MALOY, THE COLONIAL AMERICAN ORIGINS OF MODERN DEMOCRATIC 
THOUGHT 90 (2008). 
94. SILVESTER JOURDAIN, A PLAINE DESCRIPTION OF THE BARMVDAS, NOW
CALLED SOMMER ILANDS 23 (1613) (spelling modernized).  The second article 
pledged to keep the Sabbath holy, and the third turned to political matters as 
emphatically secondary to spiritual.  Id.  The Bermudans pledged to “li[v]e to-
gether in doing that which is [j]ust, both towards God and Man . . . and to 
avoide [sic] all things that stand not with the good estate of a Christian Church 
and well go[v]erned Commonwealth.”  Id. at 23–24.  Jourdain, a merchant, was 
among the sailors shipwrecked in 1609.  Teresa M. Bejan, The 1612 Project, at 
n.7, ONLINE LIBRARY OF LIBERTY (May 27, 2020), https://oll.libertyfund.
org/page/lm-smith-1620#lm-smith-1620_footnote_r3_06_ref [https://perma.
cc/8J5H-ZVL T#response3].  This pamphlet reprinted his earlier narrative, A
Discovery of the Barmudas, along with supplementary material (including the
text of the Bermuda Agreement as an appendix), the authorship of which is
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Nor, apart from those in Plymouth and Salem, were the 
Puritan churches founded in New England actually independent. 
Rather, their removal to the New World saved Puritan immigrants 
the trouble of making a formal separation from the Church of 
England, thus allowing for a kind of “comprehension” at a distance. 
Members of the Boston Church, for instance, remained 
communicants in the Church of England, and so could and would 
attend their parish churches when back in Old World.95  As this 
arrangement attests, transatlantic traffic (including repeat 
voyages) was more common in the seventeenth century than 
modern observers often realize.  It was the continued imbrication of 
the Boston Church with the episcopal establishment back home 
that ultimately catapulted an obscure Puritan minister, Roger 
Williams, on his colonial adventures.  Indeed, the failure of the New 
English churches on the whole to separate served as a crucial 
negative exemplar when Williams came to “establish” his own 
colony and its institutions. 
The story of Williams’s banishment from Massachusetts Bay is 
fairly well known.96  Like many Puritans, Williams left England in 
the 1630s not only because he wanted to flee the rising tide of 
persecution with the Church of England under Archbishop Laud, 
but because he had had enough of living in a society of sinners and 
wanted to try a society of “saints.”97  Inspired by the Puritan lawyer 
and first Governor of Massachusetts Bay, John Winthrop, Williams 
believed that Boston would prove to be a “city on a hill,” in which 
the righteous might live among the like-minded as models of 
Christian charity to the “unregenerate.”98  But Williams was soon 
uncertain.  Id. at n.7.  For a more detailed discussion of the Bermuda Agree-
ment compared with the Mayflower Compact, see id. 
95. See The Road to Banishment, in 1 THE CORRESPONDENCE OF ROGER 
WILLIAMS: 1629–1653, at 12, (Glenn W. LaFantasie ed., 1988) (editorial note). 
96. See generally PERRY MILLER, ROGER WILLIAMS: HIS CONTRIBUTION TO 
THE AMERICAN TRADITION (1963).  For a more recent and detailed account, see 
generally BARRY, supra note 22. 
97. See CHUPACK, supra note 28, at 38–41; see also EDMUND S. MORGAN, 
VISIBLE SAINTS: THE HISTORY OF A PURITAN IDEA 113 (1963) (“The English emi-
grants to New England were the first Puritans to restrict membership in the 
church to visible saints, to persons, that is, who had felt the stirrings of grace 
in their souls . . . .”). 
98. See CHUPACK, supra note 28, preface (unpaginated); see also John Win-
throp, A Modell of Christian Charity (1630), in 7 COLLECTIONS OF THE 
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disappointed.  Upon his arrival in 1631, he refused to take a 
position as teacher in the Boston Church when he realized that it 
was still formally unseparated from the Church of England.99 
Things went downhill from there. 
As Williams settled down in Massachusetts Bay, he turned his 
gift for learning languages to mastering the local Algonquin 
dialects to aid his independent missionary efforts among the local 
tribes.100  Through his “American” associates, Williams began to 
see the “unchristian Christians” of New England as hypocrites, 
ostentatiously crying out against others’ sins, while living on land 
that they had stolen from the natives in the name of Christianity—
a ruse Williams saw as worthy of the Anti-Christ (i.e., the Pope) 
himself.101 
According to his contemporaries, Williams’s radical views on 
Native American land rights were not his only “offensive” 
opinions.102  In addition to floating the suggestion that women 
should wear veils (in keeping with St. Paul’s counsel in 1 Cor. 11:6), 
his Separatist preaching apparently led supporters to deface an 
English flag by cutting out the cross of St. George.103  Cotton 
Mather would later claim that Williams had once “insisted 
vehemently upon the unlawfulness of calling any unregenerate man 
by the name of good-man such an one,” as was the Puritan 
MASSACHUSETTS HISTORICAL SOCIETY 32, 47 (3d ser. 1838) (“[W]ee shall be as a 
citty upon a hill.”). 
99. The Road to Banishment, supra note 95, at 12–13.
100. See generally Teresa M. Bejan, ‘When the Word of the Lord Runs
Freely’: Roger Williams and Evangelical Toleration, in THE LIVELY
EXPERIMENT: THE STORY OF RELIGIOUS TOLERATION IN AMERICA, FROM ROGER 
WILLIAMS TO THE PRESENT 65 (Chris Beneke & Christopher S. Grenda eds., 
2015). 
101. See ROGER WILLIAMS, CHRISTENINGS MAKE NOT CHRISTIANS (1645), re-
printed in 14 RHODE ISLAND HISTORICAL TRACTS 8–14 (Henry Martin Dexter 
ed., 1881).  The earlier pamphlet in which he apparently circulated this claim 
in Boston has been lost. 
102. Cf. ROGER WILLIAMS, A KEY INTO THE LANGUAGE OF AMERICA 143 (R.I.
& Providence Plantations Tercentenary Comm. 5th ed. 1936) (1643) (in con-
trast to the perceived innocence of the local Native American tribes, Williams 
accused the English of being particularly sinful, charging that “although they 
have not so much to restraine them (both in respect to knowledge of God and 
the Lawes of men) as the English have, yet a man shall never heare [sic] of 
such crimes amongst them of robberies, murthers [sic], [and] adulteries as 
amongst . . . the English”). 
103. The Road to Banishment, supra note 95, at 16–17.
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custom.104  Like his opposition to the English flag or its colonial 
charter, this seemingly silly objection to polite modes of address 
reflected Williams’s increasing concern about the conflation of 
“civil” and “spiritual” matters and powers in Massachusetts Bay. 
Much like the Quakers would later, he saw the colony’s use of civil 
oaths (e.g., of allegiance or in court proceedings) as a form of 
compulsory religious worship in the service of the state, as well.105 
All of this is to say that Roger Williams was, in the end, too 
Puritan for his fellow Puritans.  To the relief of parties on both 
sides, he soon left Boston for the formally separated congregation 
at Salem.106  But even then, Williams upheld what he saw as his 
non-negotiable duty as a properly evangelical Christian to continue 
to preach and publish against his Boston brethren’s errors.107 
Finally, in 1635, the government of Massachusetts took the 
extraordinary step of banishing Williams back to England108—at 
the instigation, he believed, of John Cotton, another minister of the 
Boston Church recently arrived from England.109  Williams carried 
his grudge against Cotton with him into exile in the New England 
wilderness, where he went in an effort to escape his sentence of 
deportation.110  The “wall of separation” phrase for which Williams 
would later become famous originated in his public response to 
Cotton’s private letter justifying his banishment, published in 
London as Mr. Cotton’s Letter Lately Printed, Examined and 
Answered by Roger Williams of Providence in 1644.111  He would 
104. 1 THE CORRESPONDENCE OF ROGER WILLIAMS, supra note 95, at 9 n.3
(quoting COTTON MATHER, 1 MAGNALIA CRISTI AMERICANA 117 (Silas Andrus 
1820) (1702)). 
105. See Jimmy D. Neff, Roger Williams: Pious Puritan and Strict Separa-
tionist, 38 J. CHURCH & ST. 529, 534 (1996). 
106. The Road the Banishment, supra note 95, at 13–14.
107. See id. at 14–21; see also Linford D. Fisher, Evangelicals and Unevan-
gelicals: The Contested History of a Word, 1500–1950, 26 RELIGION & AM. 
CULTURE 184, 192–94 (2016) (examining the term “evangelical” as a connota-
tion of true faith and noting its use during the colonial period in New England). 
108. The Road to Banishment, supra note 95, at 21.
109. Letter from John Cotton, in 1 THE CORRESPONDENCE OF ROGER 
WILLIAMS, supra note 95, at 31–32 (editorial note). 
110. See id.
111. CHUPACK, supra note 28, at 72; ROGER WILLIAMS, MR. COTTON’S LETTER 
LATELY PRINTED, EXAMINED, AND ANSWERED (1644), reprinted in ON RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY 46, 70 (James Calvin Davis ed., 2008).  Williams denied that he was 
2021] IS THIS A CHRISTIAN NATION? 307 
continue his public campaign against Cotton at considerably 
greater length in his pro-toleration treatise, The Bloudy Tenent of 
Persecution.112 
According to his own account, Williams received the land that 
would become Providence as a gift from the Narragansett Chief 
Canonicus after a hard winter’s exile among the Wampanoag.113  It 
is not clear that he intended to found a colony of his own, let alone 
a tolerant one.  Rather, the founding of “Rhode Island and 
Providence Plantations” seems to have been an accident.  Williams 
did not set out to lead; nevertheless, he was followed—mainly by 
other religious troublemakers and exiles like Anne Hutchinson and 
Samuel Gorton, both of whom later joined his plantation, much to 
Williams’s chagrin.114  To say that the success of the experiment 
with toleration in Rhode Island was not a foregone conclusion is an 
understatement.  Neighbors in New Amsterdam complained that 
Williams’s colony had become the “receptacle for all sorts of riff-raff 
people . . . nothing else than the sewer, (latrina) of New 
England.”115 
That “latrine” was also, for a time, the most tolerant society the 
Christian world had ever seen.116  Rhode Island welcomed 
Protestants of all stripes, as well as Jews, Muslims (at least in 
theory), American “pagans,” and even Catholic “Anti-Christians” to 
come and live together on terms of equal liberty, including the 
liberty to proselytize for their respective faiths.117  Still, its most 
the means by which Mr. Cotton’s letter found its way into print in London, but 
no one believed him.  Letter from John Cotton, supra note 109, at 32.  Jeremy 
Waldron has argued that the phrase “wall of separation” originated with the 
Anglican theologian Richard Hooker, but there are reasons to doubt it. 
WALDRON, supra note 24, at 208; cf. BEJAN, supra note 24, at 199. 
112. CHUPACK, supra note 28, at 85–86.
113. See Jack L. Davis, Williams Among the Narragansett Indians, 43 NEW
ENG. Q. 593, 598 (1970); WILLIAMS, supra note 111, at 33. 
114. See CHUPACK, supra note 28, at 40–41.
115. See 14 DOCUMENTS OF THE SENATE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK: ONE 
HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FIFTH SESSION 400 (1902). 
116. Fittingly, in the Middle Ages tolerantia was understood as a policy of
permission without approval of an acknowledged, including raw sewage.  See 
generally István Bejczy, Tolerantia: A Medieval Concept, 58 J. HIST. IDEAS 365 
(1997). 
117. ROGER WILLIAMS, THE BLOUDY TENENT OF PERSECUTION (1645), re-
printed in ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 111, at 87, 135; see BEJAN, supra 
note 24, at 50–79. 
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remarkable feature was the entire absence of an established church 
of any denomination in Williams’s colony—what Charles II called 
its “livelie experiment,” to be repeated forty years later by Penn and 
James II.118  We are now also in a position to recognize the situation 
in Rhode Island (and later in Pennsylvania) as one not of dis-
establishment, but rather non-establishment, in Laborde’s 
phrase.119  Williams certainly had the opportunity to entrench the 
religion of his choosing in his colony upon his arrival or in its 
original 1644 Parliamentary patent, secured upon his first return 
to London.120  And yet, he did not. 
The fact is clear enough.  But what of Williams’s theoretical 
principles?  Commentators usually see in Rhode Island’s non-
establishment simply the logical conclusion of Williams’ 
separationist views.  Yet the distinction between “civil” and 
“spiritual” government was, by the seventeenth century, a Calvinist 
commonplace.  Even in theocratic Geneva itself, reformed 
Protestants had been careful to respect the formal distinction 
between the civil office and authority exercised by the city 
magistrates from the spiritual authority wielded by elders of the 
Church.121  Nor does non-establishment appear to have been a 
straightforward consequence of Williams’s commitment to the 
liberty of conscience.  He had little patience for those who, like the 
Quakers, would plead conscience to avoid “pay[ing] their freight”—
i.e., taxes—whenever the “commander of the ship [of state]” deemed
it necessary for their “justice, peace, and sobriety.”122
Rather, Williams’s chief concern remained, as always, to ward 
off the spiritual “pollution” that came from mixing religion and 
politics, just as Bostonians worshipping in their parish churches in 
England brought the contagion of Catholic “Anti-Christianity” back 
with them.  It is well-known among jurists that Williams’s purpose 
118. Charter of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations - July 15, 1663,
LILLIAN GOLDMAN LAW LIBRARY, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/ri
04.asp [perma.cc/LR6R-32V6] (last visited Apr. 2, 2021); see also Sally
Schwartz, William Penn and the Toleration: Foundations of Colonial Pennsyl-
vania, 50 J. MID-ATLANTIC STUD. 284, 284–86 (1983).
119. See LABORDE, supra note 8, at 71–72.
120. See CHUPACK, supra note 28, at 59.
121. See generally PHILIP S. GORSKI, THE DISCIPLINARY REVOLUTION: 
CALVINISM AND THE RISE OF THE STATE IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE (2003). 
122. Letter from Roger Williams to the Town of Providence (Jan. 1655)
(Ship of State Letter), in ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 111, at 278, 279.  
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in restoring “the hedge or wall of separation between the Garden of 
the church and the wilderness of the world” was to keep the garden 
safe—i.e., to protect religion from the corrupting effects of 
politics.123  Still, the finer points of Williams’s argument are often 
lost when considered apart from the thoroughly establishmentarian 
context in which they were made. 
When Williams arrived back in London in 1644 to seek a patent 
for his fledgling colony, he found himself in the midst of a Civil War. 
The hated episcopal hierarchy was under attack, and the Long 
Parliament had convened a special commission of theologians—the 
Westminster Assembly of Divines—to discuss a new form of 
government for the National Church.124  In his follow-up to Mr. 
Cottons Letter Lately Printed, Williams published his Queries of 
Highest Consideration, addressed to Parliament as well as to 
Presbyterian and Independent factions within the Assembly.125  In 
this brief pamphlet, Williams reassured Parliament that: 
[C]oncerning souls, we will not (as most do) charge you with
the loads of all the souls in England, Scotland, [and]
Ireland.  We shall humbly affirm and (by the help of Christ)
maintain that the bodies and goods of the subject [are] your
charge [but] their souls (and yours) are set on account to
[others].126
Here, we catch a glimpse of the social contract theory that Williams 
later made explicit in The Bloudy Tenent, which grounded political 
power in “the people’s choice and free consent,” and consequently 
limited its exercise to “the common-wealth or safety of such a people 
in their bodies and goods.”127 
But Williams’s case against establishment was for the most 
part theological, as well as historical.  In freeing Parliament from 
the care of subjects’ souls, he reminded them of the utter hash 
previous governments had made of it, “what setting up, pulling 
123. E.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 48–53; see
WILLIAMS, supra note 111, at 70 (separation of the mundane and divine ensured 
the garden would “be walled . . . from the world”). 
124. ROBERT ASHTON, THE ENGLISH CIVIL WAR: CONSERVATISM AND 
REVOLUTION, 1603–1649, at 218–19 (1978). 
125. See Roger Williams, Queries of Highest Consideration, in ON RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY, supra note 111, at 73. 
126. Id. at 75.
127. WILLIAMS, supra note 117, at 148.
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down, what formings, reformings, and again deformings” had 
reigned ecclesiastically in England over the past century, by which 
“[t]he fathers made the children heretics, and the children the 
fathers.”128  Not only did this suggest that civil magistrates lacked 
privileged access when it came to religious truth, to put it mildly, it 
also suggested that a puritan Parliament should be glad to free 
itself of the spiritual “[s]upremacy . . . .  [o]f which power King 
Henry, upon a grudge (as ‘tis said) about his wife, despoiled the 
pope and with consent and act of Parliament sat down himself in 
the pope’s chair in England.”129  Moreover, Williams argued, in 
insisting upon retaining that power, Presbyterians and 
Independents within the Westminster Assembly were alike 
attempting “a reviving of Moses, and the sanctifying of a new Land 
of Canaan, of which we hear nothing in the Testament of Christ 
Jesus.”130 
Here, we see clearly the same charge of unwholesome 
Hebraizing that Williams would level at Cotton and other 
“unchristian Christians” of New England.131  To speak at all of a 
“national” church, sounded to Williams’s ears like a denial of 
Christ’s coming, whereby the old covenant of Israel had given way 
to the new covenant of universal grace.132  This denial would swiftly 
bring persecution in its train: 
[How could] the constitution of a national church . . . 
possibly be framed without a racking and tormenting of the 
souls, as well as of the bodies, of persons.  For it seems not 
possible to fit it to every conscience; sooner shall one suit of 
apparel fit every body [sic], one law [preside over] every 
case, or one size . . . every foot!133  
128. Williams, supra note 126, at 75, 77.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 77.
131. See WILLIAMS, supra note 102, at 8–14.  For the popularity of “Hebraic”
political theorizing in this period, see generally ERIC NELSON, THE HEBREW
REPUBLIC: JEWISH SOURCES AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPEAN POLITICAL
THOUGHT (2010). 
132. Williams, supra note 125, at 78–79.
133. Id.
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One recognizes here the boggling mind of a man practically 
acquainted with the religious diversity of his own colonial 
backwater. 
When it came to the matter of state funding for religion, in 
particular, Williams was concerned less about conscience than 
corruption.  In inveighing against so-called “hirelings”—that is, 
religious ministers trained and employed by the state—Williams 
was in good company with his friend, John Milton, who likewise 
detailed the distorting effects of government pay and discipline on 
those ostensibly committed to religious truth.134  Forced to return 
to London in 1652 in search of second colonial patent (the first being 
made void by Charles I’s decapitation), Williams once more 
embroiled himself in the ecclesiastical controversies of his 
homeland.135  In The Hireling Ministry None of Christ’s, Williams 
objected to the proposed reintroduction of tithes by the English 
Commonwealth on the grounds that a state-supported ministry 
encouraged ministers to “mak[e] a trade of preaching” and render 
“the cure of souls and the charge of men’s eternal welfare . . . a 
maintenance and living,” which was necessarily unchristian and 
corrupting.136  The Gospel had been given by God to mankind in 
general, and should be freely given by Christians to those who had 
not yet been saved, in turn.  Moreover, the public Universities 
charged with training and ordaining this ministry of servile 
hypocrites simply encouraged them in a “monkish and idle course 
of life, partly so genteel and stately, partly so vain and 
superstitious, that to wet a finger in any pains or labor is a 
disgraceful and unworthy act.”137 
As a Cambridge graduate himself, Williams maintained that 
he was a lover of humane learning for its own sake; nevertheless, 
he insisted that the “sacrilegious and superstitious degrees (as they 
call them) in the profession of divinity” granted by Universities 
simply encouraged the hireling ministry in its Pharisaical 
134. See JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 23 (Global Grey 2018) (1644) (“I hate
a pupil teacher, I endure not an instructor that comes to me under the ward-
ship of an overseeing fist.”).  
135. See Edward J. Eberle, Roger Williams’ Gift: Religious Freedom in
America, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 425, 436 (1999). 
136. ROGER WILLIAMS, THE HIRELING MINISTRY NONE OF CHRIST’S (1652), re-
printed in ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 111, at 249, 254. 
137. Id. at 254–55.
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pretenses.138  In attacking the Universities in this way, Williams 
was taking aim squarely at the best means currently available to 
Cromwell and the Commonwealth (given the collapse of the 
Westminster Assembly’s negotiations years before139) of 
maintaining the state’s authority and discipline over the clergy 
through a regime of licensing and regulation.  In 1652, Williams 
also published his objections to the so-called Humble Proposals 
presented to the Rump Parliament by the Independent minister 
John Owen.140  Owen had been inspired, in part, by John Cotton’s 
1644 account of the New England way in The Keyes to the Kingdom 
of Heaven and the Power thereof according to the Word of God.141 
Williams was evidently not the only New Englander hoping to 
influence the settlement of ecclesiastical affairs in his homeland.  
In his critique of the Humble Proposals, Williams objected 
specifically to Owen’s proposed process of civil “approval,” 
regulation, and state-licensing for preachers, as well as the 
supplementary system of “Triers and Ejectors” meant to discipline 
the Universities that trained ministers by expelling the 
heterodox.142  Again, Williams insisted that the propagation of the 
Gospel was a duty of all Christians; hence any effort by the state to 
restrict “mechanic” preaching—that is, ex tempore preaching by 
138. Id. at 255.
139. See David Plant, The Westminster Assembly, BCW PROJECT (Feb. 22,
2009), http://bcw-project.org/church-and-state/first-civil-war/westminster-as-
sembly [perma.cc/9PPG-2FZV]. 
140. Carolyn Polizzotto, The Campaign against The Humble Proposals of
1652, 38 J. ECCLESIASTICAL HIST. 569, 569 (1987); For more on Owen, see gen-
erally Manfred Svensson, John Owen and John Locke: confessionalism, doctri-
nal minimalism, and toleration, 43 HIST. EUROPEAN IDEAS 302 (2016). 
141. See Joel R. Beeke & Randall J. Pederson, John Owen: Excerpt from
Meet the Puritans, MONERGISM, https://www.monergism.com/thethreshold/
articles/onsite/meetthepuritans/johnowen.html [perma.cc/5PRY-PRT7] (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2021). 
142. See BEJAN, supra note 24, at 78; see also JEFFREY R. COLLINS, THE
ALLEGIANCE OF THOMAS HOBBES 167–69 (2005) (describing the functions of the 
“Triers and Ejectors” as a tool for “suppressing political dissent”); Jeffrey R. 
Collins, The Church Settlement of Oliver Cromwell, 87 HISTORY 18, 38–40 
(2002) (arguing that the state church under Cromwell should not be seen as 
part of the “nascent tolerationist and pluralist” thought budding elsewhere in 
religious debate). 
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those without a University education—was an unacceptable 
restriction of their evangelical liberty.143 
In these later pamphlets, Williams’s complete theory of 
ecclesiastical deregulation as a requirement of true Christianity 
comes more fully into view.  Individual Christians must be free to 
preach and propagate the Gospel, to associate freely with others to 
that end, and to elect and employ their own ministers, in turn, 
without fear or favor from either the state or any other church.  This 
platform of de-regulation will be familiar to modern Americans as 
a “free market” in religion of the kind imagined by James Madison, 
under the influence perhaps of American Baptists like Isaac 
Backus, one in which rival churches could compete for converts like 
firms for customers.144  
The association is strengthened when one considers Williams’s 
famous definition of a church in The Bloudy Tenent, as a “company 
of worshippers . . . like [unto] a corporation, society, or company of 
East India or Turk[ey] merchants, or any other society or company 
in London.”145  Williams elaborated:  
These companies may hold their courts, keep their records, 
hold disputations, and in matters concerning their society 
may dissent, divide, break into schisms and factions, sue 
and implead each other at the law, yea wholly break up and 
dissolve into pieces . . . and yet the peace of the city not be 
in the least measure impaired or disturbed—because the 
essence or being of the city . . . is essentially distinct from 
those particular societies, the city-courts, city-laws, city-
punishments distinct from theirs.  The city was before 
them and stands absolute and entire when such a 
corporation or society is taken down.146 
In this passage, one hears the echo of Williams’s childhood in 
London as the son of a merchant-tailor.  One also hears the voice of 
a man grateful that the city of Providence had yet withstood the 
sectarian impulses of its citizens, including Williams himself. 
143. See W. CLARK GILPIN, THE MILLENARIAN PIETY OF ROGER WILLIAMS 84 
(1979). 
144. See COFFEY, supra note 27, at 208; see generally RAKOVE, supra note 19.
145. WILLIAMS, supra note 117, at 98.
146. Id.
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But when it comes to the theory of religious association behind 
Williams’s definition of a church, these practical and economic 
experiences gave way to his emphatically evangelical and sectarian 
vision of Protestant Christianity.  Williams’s market metaphor 
denied the long-standing “corporal” conception of the church as the 
body of Christ, common to both Catholics and Protestants, in favor 
of a “corporate” one that clearly presupposed the supremacy of civil 
law and courts over church governance, as well as the lay and local 
control of congregations as registered corporations, instead of that 
of an ordained ministry and national (or international) 
hierarchy.147  Both features of Williams’s definition would have 
been anathema to most seventeenth-century Protestants, who 
expected ministers to be “bred” at Oxford or Cambridge,148 as 
Williams himself had been.149  But of course, Williams never joined 
a Protestant church he could not (and did not) leave in a hurry—
including the first Baptist congregation in New England.150 
Offending his fellow Christians came naturally. 
If asked, then, whether America is a Christian nation today, 
Williams would answer¾“no.”  Nations were, for him, by definition 
fallen communities that brought regenerate and unregenerate 
Christians together, along with non-Christian “infidels,” in a single 
ship of state.  For one “must go out of the world, in case we may not 
keep company in civil converse with idolaters.”151  One must be 
careful, then, not to conflate the boundaries and standards of 
membership between the “wilderness” of the worldly city and the 
“garden” of the true church.  The former should be governed by the 
standard of “mere civility” in this lifetime, the latter by “spiritual 
goodness” and truly Christian charity in this and in the life to 
come.152 
Still, a supreme irony remains: in failing to establish a church 
in Providence, Roger Williams inadvertently established his own 
evangelical and sectarian religion.  Insofar as the First Amendment 
enacted this distinctly American vision of church-state relations on 
147. RAKOVE, supra note 19, at 116–17.
148. See Murphy, supra note 80, at 6-8.
149. CHUPACK, supra note 28, at 29.
150. See id. at 64.
151. ROGER WILLIAMS, THE BLOUDY TENENT OF PERSECUTION 116 (Samuel L.
Caldwell ed., Narragansett Club 1867) (1644)  (spelling modernized). 
152. See BEJAN, supra note 24, 50–81.
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the national level, its critics are right to point out that its effect is 
not one of dis-establishment at all, but rather of the inadvertent 
establishment of evangelical Protestantism as a matter of law, an 
establishment to which we do, indeed, still expect all other religions 
and churches to conform.  As Rakove points out, American law in 
the nineteenth century developed in a de-regulatory direction 
which treated churches as corporations in precisely Williams’ sense, 
so that even the Catholic church was forced to accommodate itself 
to local incorporation and lay control.153 
IV. LOCKE’S LAST STAND
Where does this leave John Locke?  Scholars sometimes read 
Locke’s 1689 Letter Concerning Toleration as though it were a 
blessedly abbreviated and less overtly scriptural second draft of 
Williams’s Bloudy Tenent.154  This push to acknowledge his 
predecessors is, in part, the result of a concerted revisionist effort 
by historians to counteract the “Locke Obsession” that has long 
dominated histories of toleration and liberalism.155  Rakove 
describes the Letter “as a postscript to a debate that had largely run 
its course.”156  
Recently, however, the political theorist Andrew Murphy has 
argued that originality is overrated as a virtue of political thinkers 
in any case, whether in the case of Locke or William Penn.157  The 
former certainly brought theoretical clarity and practical precision, 
if not wit, to the arguments others had made before him, thereby 
creating the commonsensical case for toleration for generations of 
153. RAKOVE, supra note 19, at 117; see generally Sarah Barringer Gordon,
The First Disestablishment: Limits on Church Power and Property Before the 
Civil War, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 307, 308–12 (2014); Sarah Barringer Gordon, Re-
ligious Corporations and Disestablishment 1780–1840, in THE RISE OF
CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 63 (Micah Schwartzman, Chad Flanders & Zoë 
Robinson eds., 2016). 
154. See EDWIN S. GAUSTAD, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: ROGER WILLIAMS IN
AMERICA 196 (1991). 
155. John Christian Laursen & Cary J. Nederman, Introduction to BEYOND 
THE PERSECUTING SOCIETY: RELIGIOUS TOLERATION BEFORE THE 
ENLIGHTENMENT 1, 2–3 (John Christian Laursen & Cary J. Nederman eds., 
1998). 
156. RAKOVE, supra note 19, at 34.
157. ANDREW R. MURPHY, LIBERTY, CONSCIENCE, AND TOLERATION: THE
POLITICAL THOUGHT OF WILLIAM PENN 81 (2016). 
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liberal political theorists to come.158  Locke certainly exercised a 
more direct influence on the First Amendment than Roger Williams 
ever did.  This occurred through the medium of Madison’s close 
friend and colleague, Thomas Jefferson.  Rakove describes how, in 
preparation for a 1776 meeting of the Virginia House of Delegates 
set to consider several petitions in favor of disestablishing the 
Church of England in that state, Jefferson read and made copious 
notes on his copy of Locke’s Letter, including the tantalizing 
observation: “It was a great thing to go so far (as he himself sais 
[sic] of the parl[iament] who framed the act of toler[atio]n) . . . but 
where he stopped short, we may go on.”159 
Even so, Locke’s Letter went pretty far.  Consider its preface 
“To the Reader,” which declared: “It is neither Declarations of 
Indulgence, nor Acts of Comprehension, such as have yet been 
practised [sic] or projected amongst us . . . .  [t]he first will but 
palliate, the second increase our Evil.”160  Rather, “Absolute Liberty, 
Just and True Liberty, Equal and Impartial Liberty, is the thing 
that we stand in need of.”161  Here we find a ringing endorsement 
of evangelical liberty—and rejection of “mere” toleration—beyond 
anything Williams ever wrote.  The only problem is, of course, that 
Locke did not write it either.  For as Jefferson himself did not 
realize, nor have many commentators since, the Letter’s preface was 
written not by Locke himself, but by his friend and translator 
William Popple (1638–1708)—a figure who has yet to receive his 
due from intellectual historians.162 
Popple had been a wine merchant, based in Bordeaux with his 
family, before the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes by Louis XIV 
in 1685 put an end to the formal toleration of Protestantism in 
158. For the latest version of this argument, see generally JOHN WILLIAM
TATE, LIBERTY, TOLERATION AND EQUALITY: JOHN LOCKE, JONAS PROAST AND THE 
LETTERS CONCERNING TOLERATION (2016). 
159. RAKOVE, supra note 19, at 4 (quoting Thomas Jefferson, Notes on Locke
and Shaftesbury, in 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1760–1776, at 544, 
548 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950)). 
160. William Popple, Preface to JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING 
TOLERATION (1689), reprinted in A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION AND OTHER
WRITINGS 3, 4 (Mark Goldie ed., 2010). 
161. Id.
162. The one notable exception is Caroline Robbins, Absolute Liberty: The
Life and Thought of William Popple, 1638–1708, 24 WM. & MARY Q. 190 (1967). 
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France.163  He was able to return to England only with difficulty, 
possibly through Penn’s personal intervention with James II.164  By 
the time he undertook to translate Locke’s Letter—written 
originally in Latin in 1685 as an Epistola de Tolerantia165—Popple 
had published his own A Rational Catechism, as well as the 
exhaustively titled Three Letters tending to Demonstrate how the 
Security of this Nation against all Future Persecution for Religion, 
lys in the Abolishment of the Present Penal Laws . . . and the 
Establishment of a New Law for Universal Liberty of Conscience.166 
As this title suggests, Popple was already on record as viewing mere 
“indulgence” as insufficient. 
Recalling the place of Popple in what we know today as Locke’s 
Letter reminds us also of the conditions under which the original 
Epistola de Tolerantia was produced.  Like Popple, Locke was in 
Europe at the Revocation; but unlike Popple, he was safe in the 
Netherlands when the Edict was revoked.167  There, Locke 
witnessed the arrival of countless Huguenots “refugees” (from the 
French refugiez) fleeing persecution.168  He appears to have written 
the original Epistola at the request of his friend Philipp van 
Limborch, a Dutch theologian and professor in Amsterdam.169 
Despite its seemingly quintessential Englishness, then, Locke’s 
Letter was written originally in Latin for a European audience and 
addressed to the problems of international Protestantism, rather 
than in English for dissenters seeking toleration for themselves 
either outside of or within an established National Church. 
Indeed, before he fled England as a suspected terrorist in 
1683—when several of his friends were discovered behind the Rye 
House Plot to assassinate Charles II along with his openly Catholic 
brother, James170—Locke had been notoriously lukewarm on 
163. Id. at 191–92.
164. Id. at 203–04.
165. Mark Goldie, Introduction to A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION AND 
OTHER WRITINGS, supra note 160, at ix, xi. 
166. Robbins, supra note 162, at 190–91.
167. 2 ERIC MACK, JOHN LOCKE 10 (John Meadowcroft ed., 2013).
168. BEJAN, supra note 24, at 127.
169. Svensson, supra note 140, at 308.
170. Philip Milton, John Locke and the Rye House Plot, 43 HIST. J. 647, 649,
666–67 (2000). 
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toleration.171  His early unpublished Tracts on Government (c. 
1660–2), written while a young scholar at Oxford, reflected his 
rather enthusiastic embrace of Hobbes’s arguments in Leviathan 
(1651) in favor of a formally intolerant, albeit latitudinarian, 
establishment in service to the state.172  A visit to Cleves in 1665 
apparently convinced Locke that peaceful coexistence between 
those who differed in religion was at least possible.173  Still, his 
1667 Essay Concerning Toleration endorsed comprehension (or 
“latitudinism”) as the preferred course:  
[T]oleration conduces no otherwise to the settlement of a
government than as it makes the majority of one mind and
encourages virtue in all, which is done by . . . making the
terms of church communion as large as may be, i.e., that
your articles in speculative opinions be few and large, and
ceremonies in worship few and easy.174
Once achieved, a supplementary indulgence could accommodate 
any non-Christians and “fanatics” who remained of necessity 
outside the National Church. 
Needless to say, Locke would later change his tune and 
embrace toleration as a matter of right for Christians and non-
Christians alike.  Still, one must be careful not to lose sight of 
Popple’s hand in the Letter’s more radical moments.  Consider its 
famous definition of a church as “a voluntary Society of Men, joining 
themselves together of their own accord,” like other private 
associations of “Philosophers for Learning, of Merchants for 
Commerce, or of men of leisure for mutual Conversation and 
171. MACK, supra note 167, at 10.  For a comprehensive treatment of Locke’s
intellectual development on the issue of toleration, see generally JOHN 
MARSHALL, JOHN LOCKE, TOLERATION AND EARLY ENLIGHTENMENT CULTURE 
(2006). 
172. See BEJAN, supra note 24, at 115–20.  For more on Locke’s early Hob-
bism, see generally JEFFREY R. COLLINS, IN THE SHADOW OF LEVIATHAN: JOHN 
LOCKE AND THE POLITICS OF CONSCIENCE (2020). 
173. Letter from John Locke to Robert Boyle (Dec. 12, 1665), in 1 THE
CORRESPONDENCE OF JOHN LOCKE 227, 228 (E. S. De Beer ed., 1976). 
174. JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING TOLERATION (1667), reprinted in A 
LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION AND OTHER WRITINGS, supra note 160, at 105, 
131–32.  
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Discourse.”175  Later in the Letter, the motives drawing men 
together in churches are compared with those seeking “Company 
for Trade and Profit: [or] Others, for want of Business, [who] have 
their Clubs for Clarret.”176  But the “Clarret” line was Popple’s, 
evidently inspired by his own experiences as a wine merchant (and 
likely oenophile).177  Locke’s own examples of philosophical 
societies and clubs for conversation among men of leisure were 
more edifying and high-minded on the whole.178  
Locke’s definition of a church is often compared to Williams’s 
in The Bloudy Tenent, but notice that the emphasis in the former 
was on the private and informal nature of the association between 
individuals in search of the joys of “company,” rather than the legal 
incorporation of a company that might therefore own and alienate 
property, make contracts, and press claims in a court of law. 
Although both implied an equally radical transformation when it 
came to the traditional, corporal understanding of membership in 
the Christian church—instead of being a “member” of the body of 
Christ, like a hand or a foot, the individual becomes a voluntary 
“member” of a private club—the privacy of Locke’s spiritual 
associations was, crucially, consistent with the persistence of a 
properly public form of worship. 
More fundamentally, in Locke one can recognize the 
development of the modern private sphere—as a conceptual and 
physical space in which individuals freely associated with one 
another on the basis of their particular beliefs and interests—as an 
intellectual and institutional emanation of public religion.179  And 
175. JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (1689), reprinted in A 
LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION AND OTHER WRITINGS, supra note 160, at 7, 
15–16 (footnote omitted). 
176. Id. at 56.
177. See Notes on the Texts, in A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION AND 
OTHER WRITINGS, supra note 160, at xxix, xxxi. 
178. Popple himself was a member of one such Lockean association, the un-
prepossessingly named “Dry Club.”  MARSHALL, supra note 171, at 519.  Per-
haps he was trying to send Locke a message with his translation?  
179. Cf. Abizadeh, supra note 26, at 264–65 (“[A] key social and ideological
function of the emerging private sphere in the early modern period was, rather 
than to protect diversity, to make public uniformity possible.”).  For a system-
atic treatment of the emergence of the concept of privacy, see generally Russell 
Bogue, Privacy: A Political Approach (2020) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Oxford) (on file with the University of Oxford Libraries). 
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yet, many scholars nonetheless infer a “Lockean” commitment to 
disestablishment in the Letter.  Rakove, for example, cites his 
insistence that:  
No body [sic] is born a Member of any Church.  Otherwise 
the Religion of Parents would descend unto Children, by 
the same right of Inheritance as their Temporal Estates, 
and every one would hold his Faith by the same Tenure he 
does his Lands; than which nothing can be imagined more 
absurd.180 
Or even more resolutely, that “there is absolutely no such thing, 
under the Gospel, as a Christian Commonwealth.”181  Not even 
Williams could (or did) say it better. 
Certainly, there is a principle of separation implied here.  But 
of what?  “Church” and “State,” yes, but in what sense?  In Locke, 
as in Williams, the emphasis remains on “churches” and “civil 
societies” as distinct forms of community—the former voluntary, 
the latter involuntary—each with its different standards of 
membership.  Locke is more emphatic than Williams that an 
individuals’ civil rights must not depend on church membership, 
but then again, he was writing in a European context facing a rising 
tide of Protestant refugees to countries that already had their own 
public Protestant churches.182  Yet like Williams, Locke looked 
beyond the confines of Protestant Christianity to imagine the 
implications of his arguments for other kinds of difference: “Nay if 
we may openly speak the Truth and as becomes one Man to another; 
neither Pagan, nor Mahumetan, nor Jew, ought to be excluded from 
the Civil Rights of the Commonwealth, because of his Religion.”183 
This is, at first blush, a toleration of truly Williams-esque largesse. 
Still, it does not seem that Locke’s understanding of separation 
demanded the disestablishment of public churches in the way that 
many modern readers assume.  Despite his heterodoxy, Locke 
himself remained a communicating member of the Church of 
England all of his life.184  While this was initially a matter of 
180. LOCKE, supra note 175, at 15; see RAKOVE, supra note 19, at 46.
181. LOCKE, supra note 175, at 42.
182. For background, see generally HAEFELI, supra note 27.
183. See LOCKE, supra note 175, at 15.
184. See Samuel C. Pearson, Jr., The Religion of John Locke and the Char-
acter of His Thought, 58 J. RELIGION 244, 245, 256, 260 (1978). 
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compulsion, after the Act of Toleration suspended punishments for 
non-attendance and non-conformity, it became a matter of choice. 
And for Locke, individual choice—not disestablishment—had 
always been the point.185  The familiar picture of Locke as a 
political radical and would-be revolutionary in exile thus distracts 
from the fact that by the time the Letter was published—in the 
same year as his celebrated Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding and the (anonymous) Two Treatises of 
Government—Locke was back in London and well on his way to 
bureaucratic respectability.186  
Over the next fifteen years, until his death in 1704, Locke 
would become a distinguished public servant,187 one who evidently 
used his position on the Board of Trade and Plantations to secure a 
place for Popple as its secretary.188  As a respectable bureaucrat, 
Locke counted many latitudinarian clergymen among his friends 
and acquaintances, above all the Bishop of Salisbury, Gilbert 
Burnet.189  In his long-running controversy with the conservative 
clergyman Jonas Proast in defense of the original Letter, Locke 
recommended Burnet’s Pastoral Care (1692) as a model of clerical 
moderation.190  Locke’s campaign against Proast would produce 
three more Letters on Toleration (the last of which remained 
unfinished at his death), in which some combination of toleration 
outside of and comprehension within the Church of England 
remained his preferred policy arrangement.191 
185. Cf. LOCKE, supra note 175, at 15 (“[T]he Power of Civil Government
relates only to Mens [sic] Civil Interests; is confined to the care of the things of 
this World; and hath nothing to do with the World to come.”). 
186. See MACK, supra note 167, at 10.
187. R.S. WOOLHOUSE, LOCKE: A BIOGRAPHY 361–419 (2007).
188. Robbins, supra note 162, at 210.
189. See Tony Claydon, Latitudinarianism and Apocalyptic History in the
Worldview of Gilbert Burnet, 1643–1715, 51 THE HIST. J. 577, 580 (2008). 
190. JOHN LOCKE, A THIRD LETTER FOR TOLERATION (1692), reprinted in A 
LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION AND OTHER WRITINGS, supra note 160, at 69, 
95. 
191. See Goldie, supra note 68, at 143.  In a letter to Limborch, Locke iden-
tified both as forms of toleration—“The former signifies extension of the bound-
aries of the Church, with a view to including greater numbers by the removal 
of part of the ceremonies,” while “the latter signifies toleration of those who 
are either unwilling or unable to unite themselves to the Church of England 
on the terms offered to them.”  Letter from John Locke to Phillipus van 
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In this preference, Locke himself was clearly much less radical 
than Williams or Popple.  And recognizing this fact, in turn, allows 
us to make sense of—rather than apologize for or explain away—
the Letter’s more uncomfortable features, above all its implicit 
exclusion of Roman Catholics from toleration (via an analogy to the 
followers of the “Mufti of Constantinople”), as well as the explicit 
exclusion of atheists (for “the taking away of God, though but even 
in thought, dissolves all”).192  Both suggest that while Locke was 
straightforwardly opposed to penal laws and wanted to break the 
Church of England’s monopoly on public worship, he nonetheless 
accepted the use of Test Acts and civil oaths as a means of ensuring 
that only those who supported this “tolerant” ecclesiastical 
settlement could participate fully as equals in public life.  That 
there would still be a role for the state in regulating religion is 
further evidenced by Locke’s insistence that only those churches 
that “own and teach the Duty of tolerating All men in matters of 
meer [sic] Religion” have the right to be tolerated themselves.193 
This is not simply a theoretical claim, that the intolerant have 
themselves no claim to toleration194; rather, in the context of 
seventeenth-century English establishment, Locke’s statement 
implies an ongoing need for policing by the state of both religious 
doctrine and personnel. 
In Mere Civility, I highlighted the role that the idea of trust or 
fides plays in Locke’s political theory, and how for him, that trust 
was predicated on a set of shared beliefs—in the existence of God, 
for example, and of rewards and punishments in the afterlife—as 
the foundation of any mutually tolerable civil society.195  Here, I 
want to emphasize how Locke’s sense of a profound need for this 
minimal, but necessarily creedal, kind of conformity complemented 
his conviction that established churches and their clergy might yet 
have an important role to play in tolerant societies, as models of 
moral virtue and “reasonable” religion for others.196  For example, 
Limborch (Mar. 12, 1689), in 3 THE CORRESPONDENCE OF JOHN LOCKE 582, 584 
(E.S. de Beer ed., 1978). 
192. LOCKE, supra note 175, at 52–53.
193. Id. at 51.
194. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 191–93 (rev. ed. 1999).
195. BEJAN, supra note 24, at 136–38.
196. Cf. JOHN LOCKE, THE REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY 180 (George W.
Ewing ed., Regnery Gateway 1989) (1695) (a basic faith and acceptance of 
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even in the Letter itself, the civil magistrate retains a hortatory role 
as an evangelist with superior resources with which to extol the 
virtues of true Christianity.197 
Historians of American law and religion have noted the 
emergence of an informal “moral” or “indirect establishment” in 
nineteenth century America, despite the First Amendment, in the 
form of religious tests, temperance campaigns, bible reading in 
schools, and Sabbatarian legislation.198  In the 1690s, Locke 
likewise favored the public campaigns against vice associated with 
the so-called “Reformation of Manners,” led by latitudinarian 
bishops like Burnet.199  Locke’s notorious 1697 Essay on the Poor 
Law argued that children caught begging should be sent to public 
“working schools” wherein they might be made to “come constantly 
to church every Sunday,” because “their idle and loose way of 
breeding up [made them] as utter strangers both to religion and 
morality as they are to industry.”200  And, as the political theorist 
Jack Turner has shown, Locke approved and facilitated state-
supported missionary efforts among the American Indians in his 
gospel “suits the lowest capacities of reasonable creatures” so that society may 
function with the morals necessary to disabuse its citizens of “any conceits, any 
wrong rules, [and] anything tending to their own self-interest . . . in their mo-
rality”). 
197. LOCKE, supra note 175, at 13–14; cf. COREY BRETTSCHNEIDER, WHEN
THE STATE SPEAKS, WHAT SHOULD IT SAY?: HOW DEMOCRACIES CAN PROTECT
EXPRESSION AND PROMOTE EQUALITY 21 (2012) (“Rights such as freedom of ex-
pression correctly protect citizens against coercive intervention, but I argue 
that these rights do not extend to a right not to be persuaded by the state.”). 
198. RAKOVE, supra note 19, at 122; compare STEVEN K. GREEN, THE SECOND 
DISESTABLISHMENT: CHURCH AND STATE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 
149–205 (2010) (outlining how Christian-majority sentiments policed minori-
ties through the law in the nineteenth century), and Jud Campbell, Testimo-
nial Exclusions and Religious Freedom in Early America, 37 LAW & HIST. REV. 
431, 431–92 (2019) (focusing particularly on the inability for non-Christians to 
testify in courts of law). 
199. See WILLIAM J. BULMAN, ANGLICAN ENLIGHTENMENT: ORIENTALISM, 
RELIGION AND POLITICS IN ENGLAND AND ITS EMPIRE, 1648–1715, at 254–55 
(2015); Karen Sonnelitter, The Reformation of Manners Societies, the Monar-
chy, and the English State, 1696–1714, 72 HISTORIAN 517, 518–20 (2010). 
200. JOHN LOCKE, ESSAY ON THE POOR LAW (1697), reprinted in POLITICAL
ESSAYS 182, 191–92 (Mark Goldie ed., 1997). 
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capacity as a member of the Board of Trade and Plantations of the 
kind that Williams abhorred.201  
Still, there remains a crucial difference between Locke’s 
version of an “indirect” moral establishment, and that favored by 
Americans in the nineteenth century.  Whereas the latter was led 
by a mass movement of greatly “awakened” evangelical Christians, 
Locke’s cultural establishment was to be the top-down work of 
“reasonable” gentlemen—government bureaucrats like himself, 
along with latitudinarian clergymen like Burnet—who might model 
civility and moderation for others while acting as moral censors 
from their institutional perches in parish churches and 
Universities, or any other non-governmental yet representatively 
“public” institutions overseen and supported by the state.202 
All of this should remind us that there is quite a lot of space 
between Roger Williams’s radical commitment to religious 
deregulation, both in New England and Old, and Locke’s more 
moderate establishmentarian vision of reform.  Asked whether 
America is a Christian nation, Locke might respond, then, that it 
is—and that it is foolhardy for any Christian nation not to maintain 
an irenic and liberal “establishment” in its public institutions, one 
sufficient to moderate the nation’s more intolerant impulses. 
Whereas Williams’s inadvertent establishment of evangelical 
Protestantism dismantled the dynamic of dissent, Locke’s informal 
establishment of liberal Protestantism preserved it.  Religious non-
conformity would and should be legalized; yet there should also 
remain an established church around which individuals and private 
associations might or might not choose to conform.  
V. IRENIC LIBERALISM
Keeping the contrast between Williams’s evangelical 
sectarianism and Locke’s irenic liberal Protestantism in mind, we 
are now in a position to see—contrary to the contemporary critics 
of liberalism considered in the introduction—that not all 
sublimated Protestantisms are created equal.  We are also in a 
201. See Jack Turner, John Locke, Christian Mission, and Colonial Amer-
ica, 8 MOD. INTELL. HIST. 267, 275 (2011). 
202. For an American version of Locke’s ecclesiastical establishment in the
form of Thomas Jefferson’s visions of a public university, see RAKOVE, supra 
note 19, at 161–62 (in Jefferson’s view, “the point of education . . . was to enable 
children to reach an age when they would be capable of ascertaining their own 
norms of religious truth or faith”). 
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position to appreciate better the long shadow that these early 
modern debates cast over the way that we continue to think and 
speak about religious difference in the United States today—not 
only in academia, but in the broader public sphere. 
For example, the conceptual presuppositions of a religious 
establishment—whether evangelical or irenic—can be seen in the 
“parochial” vocabulary employed by political theorists to this day, 
which continues to bear tell-tale traces of the statist-confessional 
English ecclesiastical context, without a compensatory awareness 
of the tensions this context sometimes produces in our theories. 
The basic liberal model of toleration as the accommodation of 
“dissent”—whether of individuals singly or collectively in voluntary 
association with others—presupposes a consensus; while the term 
“disestablishment” applies properly only to contexts wherein there 
had formerly been an established Church.203 
Indeed, it is hard to exaggerate the lasting cultural impact of 
the English tradition of dissenting Protestantism on modern 
liberalism, beginning with John Stuart Mill.204  It is evident in the 
continued liberal valorization of dissent, and its elevation of the 
individual dissenter or “conscientious objector” as a heroic figure, 
as in Mill’s account of Socrates or Robert Bolt’s depiction of Thomas 
More in A Man For All Seasons.205  In this section, I shall focus on 
one paragon of American liberalism, in particular, for whom this 
establishmentarian model was also fundamental.   
As noted in the introduction, John Rawls’s arguments have 
exercised an outsized influence on how political theorists and 
jurists continue to understand the demands of secular liberal 
societies with respect to religion.  And, as we have seen, Rawls 
himself was emphatic in claiming the significance of early modern 
toleration debates in the development of modern liberalism.  
203. This is why Laborde prefers the term “nonestablishment” in explicat-
ing liberal principles, but her locution has not yet caught on.  LABORDE, supra 
note 8, at 69. 
204. See, e.g., John Gray, John Stuart Mill on Liberty, Utility, and Rights,
23 HUM. RTS. 80, 80–116 (1981); J. Salwyn Shapiro, John Stuart Mill: Pioneer 
of Democratic Liberalism in England, J. HIST. IDEAS 127, 127–60 (1943); Bran-
don P. Turner, John Stuart Mill and the Antagonistic Foundation of Liberal 
Politics, 72 REV. POL. 25, 25–53 (2010). 
205. See Frederick Rosen, J.S. Mill on Socrates, Pericles and the Truth, 25
J. LEGAL HIST. 181, 186–88 (2004); see generally JACOB T. LEVY, RATIONALISM, 
PLURALISM, AND FREEDOM (2014).
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Rawls was also an unstinting separationist.  His 1971 book A 
Theory of Justice used the terms “toleration,” “religious freedom,” 
and “liberty of conscience” interchangeably,206 while Political 
Liberalism associated these straightforwardly with the separation 
of church and state.207  Indeed, the influential theory of “public 
reason” he proposed in the later work actually worked to extend the 
wall of separation between religion and politics to public discourse 
itself, by governing the justification of matters pertaining to 
“constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice” in a well-
ordered society.208  
Nevertheless, one can see clearly at work in Rawls’s thought 
traces of both the evangelical and irenic Protestant impulses 
associated with Williams and Locke, respectively.  Before his death 
in 2002, the suggestion that Rawls had been a Protestant thinker, 
or that his religious identity had in any way inflected his theory of 
political liberalism, would have been deeply offensive to many self-
identified “Rawlsians.”  Even with publication in 2009 of his 
Princeton undergraduate thesis, A Brief Inquiry into the Meaning 
of Sin and Faith: An Interpretation Based on the Concept of 
Community, its editor made sure to include a previously 
unpublished 1997 reflection, On My Religion, in the same volume, 
as a record of exactly where and when Rawls had lost his faith.209  
This was reputedly in the Pacific theater in World War II; but 
before he enlisted, the young Rawls evidently considered training 
as an Episcopalian priest.210  Reading the undergraduate thesis in 
light of this surprising fact is fascinating, particularly in its 
emphasis on Christian communalism.  The young Rawls argued 
206. See RAWLS, supra note 194, at 180–94.
207. See Rawls, Public Reason Revisited, supra note 3, at 440–90.
208. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 3, at 215.
209. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A BRIEF INQUIRY INTO THE MEANING OF SIN
AND FAITH: WITH “ON MY RELIGION” (Thomas Nagel ed., 2009).  On the first 
page of the thesis, Rawls tells us that “the sooner we stop kow-towing to Plato 
and Aristotle the better [because] [a]n ounce of the Bible is worth a pound (pos-
sibly a ton) of Aristotle.”  John Bordley Rawls, A Brief Inquiry into the Meaning 
of Sin and Faith: An Interpretation Based on the Concept of Community (1942) 
[hereinafter RAWLS, A BRIEF INQUIRY], in A BRIEF INQUIRY INTO THE MEANING 
OF SIN AND FAITH, supra, at 103, 107.  He also declared that this “writer hap-
pens to” believe in the existence of devils and angels.  Id. at 148. 
210. Eric Gregory, Before the Original Position: The Neo-Orthodox Theology
of the Young John Rawls, 35 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 179, 184 (2007). 
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that sin should be understood as that which “destr[oys] and 
repudiat[es]” community, while faith is “the inner state of a person 
who is properly integrated and related to community.”211  Indeed, 
Rawls makes the strong, Augustinian claim that human beings are 
moral persons by virtue of their creation “Imago Dei as that which 
in man makes him capable of entering into community by virtue of 
[his] likeness to God, who is in Himself community,” i.e., in the form 
of the Trinity.212 
Rawls’s early obsession with community as constitutive of 
human personality is preserved in his ostensibly individualistic 
mature writings: his claim in A Theory of Justice that “[o]nly in a 
social union is the individual complete”213 presents a milder version 
of his earlier claim in the thesis that man “is nothing until he is in 
community” with others or that “[c]ommunality . . . constitutes the 
inner essence of man’s being.”214  Accordingly, in the last decade a 
number of political theorists and historians have worked to restore 
Rawls’s religion as an important feature of his intellectual 
formation, one that exercised an often unacknowledged influence 
on the direction of his thought long after he had given up on the 
priesthood.215  
Rawls first made his famous claim about “the wars of religion 
of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries” following the 
Reformation as the context within which the principle of toleration 
(and hence the tradition of political liberalism) developed in his 
Tanner lectures at Oxford in 1977.216  And yet his fascination with 
211. RAWLS, A BRIEF INQUIRY, supra note 209, at 113.
212. Id.
213. RAWLS, supra note 194, at 523 n.4.
214. RAWLS, A BRIEF INQUIRY, supra note 209, at 126, 215.
215. See generally ERIC NELSON, THE THEOLOGY OF LIBERALISM: POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY AND THE JUSTICE OF GOD (2019); P. Mackenzie Bok, To The Moun-
taintop Again: The Early Rawls and Post-Protestant Ethics in Postwar Amer-
ica, 14 MOD. INTELL. HIST. 153 (2017); Gregory, supra note 210.  
216. John Rawls, The Basic Liberties and Their Priority, in LIBERTY, 
EQUALITY, AND LAW: SELECTED TANNER LECTURES ON MORAL PHILOSOPHY 3, 17 
(John Rawls & Sterling M. McMurrin eds., 1987).  This claim would become 
most closely associated with Political Liberalism, but it appears with almost 
identical phrasing in John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphys-
ical, 14 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFFAIRS 223, 223–51 (1985) [hereinafter Rawls, 
Justice as Fairness], JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES (1999), and JOHN 
RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT (Erin Kelly ed., 2001) 
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the historical process whereby the principle of toleration was 
accepted in Western Europe began much earlier.  In On My 
Religion, Rawls described reading Henry Lea’s massive multi-
volume history of the Spanish Inquisition and Lord Acton’s review 
of it, shortly after his return to the United States after WWII, and 
he credited these with his increasing awareness of the persecutory 
potential of Christianity.217  
Rawls’s historical interest in toleration piqued his 
philosophical curiosity, in turn.  “Tolerance and its Justifications” 
would be the subject of one of his earliest lectures as an assistant 
professor of Philosophy at Cornell (c.1953–55).218  In a lecture at 
Harvard in the early 1960s, he presented the general acceptance of 
religious toleration—as well as the moral (if not political) rejection 
of racial segregation—as evidence that the “leading political and 
social questions of the modern age” were “in our country [e.g., the 
United States] in a sense resolved.”219  The optimism of a mid-
century American liberal—one who believed that the telos of 
secular liberal democracy could be achieved in the United States 
under a Supreme Court led by Chief Justice Warren—can be seen 
in Theory, as well.  That work offered a highly theoretical and 
abstract version of the “first freedom” argument, in which religious 
liberty was treated as the individual right from which all others 
must flow.220  
In Theory, liberty of conscience emerged as the first, “basic” 
liberty agreed upon in the Original Position and from which all the 
others could be derived: once “[t]he question of equal liberty of 
conscience is settled.  It [becomes] one of the fixed points of our 
considered judgments of justice. . . .  [t]he reasoning in this case can 
be generalized to apply to other freedoms, although not always with 
[hereinafter RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT], as well as in 
Rawls’s collected lectures on moral and political philosophy. 
217. John Rawls, On My Religion (1997), in A BRIEF INQUIRY INTO THE 
MEANING OF SIN AND FAITH, supra note 209, at 259, 264. 
218. John Rawls, Tolerance and its Justifications (unpublished essays and
notes) (on file with Harvard University Archives, Rawls Papers, Box 7, Folder 
16) (Courtesy of Harvard University Archives).
219. John Rawls, Some Notes on the Use of Political Philosophy (undated)
(on file with the Harvard University Archives, Rawls Papers, Box 35, Folder 
10) (Courtesy of Harvard University Archives).
220. See RAWLS, supra note 194, at 180–90.
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the same force.”221  Lest one quibble that arguments for liberty of 
conscience are not necessarily the same as arguments for religious 
freedom, Rawls explained in a footnote that the principle of equal 
liberty derives from the “intuitive idea . . . [of] generaliz[ing] the 
principle of religious toleration to a social form, thereby arriving at 
equal liberty in public institutions.”222  
Thus, Rawls’s influential statement in Justice as Fairness: 
Political not Metaphysical, that the “public conception of justice” at 
the heart of liberal or constitutional democracy derives from 
“apply[ing] the principle of toleration to philosophy itself” simply 
extended and refined a point he had made fifteen years earlier in 
Theory.223  He rendered this theoretical claim about the priority of 
toleration for liberalism historical a few years later in Political 
Liberalism.  But what surprises the visitor to Rawls’s archived 
papers at Harvard is how historically minded he had been about 
religious toleration from the very start.224  Throughout the 1950s, 
Rawls had done an impressive amount of historical research, taking 
extensive notes on the Huguenot debates in Holland following the 
Revocation of the Edict of Nantes into which Locke’s own Epistola 
was an intervention.225  
More surprising still is what caught Rawls’s historical interest. 
This was above all the so-called “Compromise Theory of Tolerance” 
offered by the little-known Dutch theologian Isaac d’Huisseau.226 
221. Id. at 206.
222. Id. at 205 n.6.  This statement would, of course, surprise many of the
early modern defenders of religious toleration we have considered thus far. 
223. Rawls, Justice as Fairness, supra note 216, at 223.
224. See generally Teresa M. Bejan, Rawls’s Teaching and the ‘Tradition’ of
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As the title suggests, this was, in fact, an irenic Protestant theory 
of comprehension through creedal minimalism and sacramental 
inclusion of the kind developed by latitudinarians in England like 
Burnet.227  Similarly, in On My Religion, Rawls cited as inspiration 
not Locke’s Letter, nor any other classic text of the Anglo-American 
liberal tradition, but rather an obscure bit of irenic esoterica by the 
French jurist Jean Bodin (c.1530–96):  
Of the many texts I have read on religion, few have struck 
me as much as Bodin’s . . . Colloquium of the Seven [on the 
Secrets of the Sublime]. . . .  For him, toleration is an aspect 
and consequence of the harmony of nature as expressed in 
God’s creation. . . .  At the end of the Colloquium, the seven 
speakers agree to abandon their attempts to refute one 
another’s religious opinions, and instead to encourage one 
another to describe their religious views so that all may 
learn what others think and be able to understand what 
their beliefs are in their best light.  Thus, while friendly 
and sympathetic discussion of our beliefs is accepted as an 
important part of religious life, argument and controversy 
are not.  In view of the harmony and multiplicity of 
religions, what point would argument and controversy 
serve?228 
In 1997, Rawls was explicit that what appealed to him most in 
Bodin was his irenicism—that is, his willingness to see religious 
differences between those who were otherwise agreed in a moral 
way of life as, strictly speaking, indifferent.  It was a vision of 
religion in line with the liberal Episcopalian Protestanism of 
Rawls’s youth.229  Moreover, it suggested that this liberal 
Protestant outlook continued to structure his thinking about the 
form and features of a tolerant society, long after he left that 
particular church. 
227. Id.
228. Rawls, supra note 217, at 266; cf. FORST, supra note 83, at 151 (using
a “Rawlsian expression” of “reasonable disagreement” to describe the religious 
debate in Bodin’s work).  The Colloquium was first published in English in 
1975.  See generally JEAN BODIN, COLLOQUIUM OF THE SEVEN ABOUT SECRETS OF
THE SUBLIME (Marion Leathers Daniels Kuntz trans., Princeton U. Press 1975) 
(1857).  Rawls must have read it shortly thereafter.  
229. See Rawls, supra note 217, at 261.
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We can see now that Rawls’s interest in historical arguments 
for comprehension bore theoretical fruit in Political Liberalism. 
Whereas a Theory of Justice had focused on “congruence” and  the 
“harmony of interests” as the bonds of well-ordered society, Political 
Liberalism stressed the harmony of affect.230  The latter was an 
avowedly irenic tract—as Rawls put it in retrospect in 1998: “I 
make a point in Political Liberalism of really not discussing 
anything, as far as I can help it, that will put me at odds with any 
theologian, or any philosopher.”231  One sees this irenic orientation 
not only in its search for an underlying agreement on the 
fundamenta of liberalism that can serve as “the basis of . . . social 
unity” in a liberal society,232 but also in its hope for an 
appropriately constrained form of public discourse, through which 
citizens’ disagreements might be transformed into sources of 
solidarity.   
Rather than an idealized extension of the principle of 
disestablishment, then, Rawls’s idea of public reason appears here 
as an irenic attempt to take controversial items off of the agenda 
for the sake of reconciliation—much like the early modern 
arguments for comprehension that had inspired Locke centuries 
before.  As Rawls put it in the Idea of Public Reason, Revisited:  
Harmony and concord among doctrines and a people’s 
affirming public reason are unhappily not a permanent 
condition of social life.  Rather, harmony and concord 
depend on the vitality of the public political culture and on 
citizens’ [sic] being devoted to and realizing the ideal of 
public reason.  Citizens could easily fall into bitterness and 
230. Compare RAWLS, supra note 194, at 104–05, 453 (seeking to describe
the “natural sense in which harmony of social interests is achieved” and 
“whether the sense of justice coheres with the conception of our good so that 
both work together to uphold a just scheme”), with RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM, supra note 3, at 213 (Public reason “presents how things might be, 
taking people as a just and well-ordered society would encourage them to be. 
It describes what is possible and can be, yet may never be, though no less fun-
damental for that.”). 
231. Bernard Prusak, An Interview with John Rawls: Politics, Religion, and
the Public Good, COMMONWEAL, Sept. 25, 1998, at 12, 12–17, reprinted in JOHN 
RAWLS, COLLECTED PAPERS 616, 621–22 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999). 
232. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 3, at 63.
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resentment, once they no longer see the point of affirming 
an ideal of public reason and come to ignore it.233  
Evidently, Rawls believed that in this regard political 
philosophers like himself occupying positions within the 
intellectual establishment had an important role to play in 
democratic societies.  Justice as Fairness: A Restatement presented 
the first “practical role” of political philosophy as “arising from 
divisive political conflict and the need to settle the problem of 
order”: 
We suppose, then, that one task of political philosophy . . . 
is to focus on deeply disputed questions and to see whether, 
despite appearances, some underlying basis of 
philosophical and moral agreement can be uncovered.  Or 
if such a basis of agreement cannot be found, perhaps the 
divergence of . . . opinion at the root of divisive political 
differences can at least be narrowed.234  
The apparent optimism underlying this approach had been 
remarked upon years earlier by Isaiah Berlin: “[m]y only doubts 
arise about the degree of your optimism in the possibility of offering 
your views, with which I totally agree, as a permanent basis within 
which disagreements can be resolved.235 
In this section, I have not been concerned to unmask or debunk 
the ostensibly “secular” views put forward by Rawls and his 
followers as fundamentally theological, in the style of some of 
liberalism’s critics.  Rather, I have sought to show that the striking 
Christian communalism of Rawls’s early work informed his later 
preoccupation with the sources of social unity in a liberal society. 
On this view, the shift in Rawls’s considered judgments on that 
score between Theory and Political Liberalism was akin to an 
increasingly latitudinarian expansion of the bounds of orthodoxy, 
in the hope that the bonds formed between citizens united by an 
overlapping consensus might render their civil communion stable 
over time.  Only now, Rawls insisted that those bonds would not be 
233. Rawls, Public Reason Revisited, supra note 3, at 485.
234. RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT, supra note 216, at 2.
235. Letter from Isaiah Berlin to John Rawls (Aug. 31, 1988) (on file with
the Harvard University Archives, Rawls Papers, Box 39, Folder 6) (Courtesy 
of Harvard University Archives).  
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of Christian love, but of civic friendship, reciprocity, and mutual 
respect.236   
Despite his apparent commitment to dis- or non-establishment 
as a necessary consequence of the separation of church and state, 
we might think of this shift in Rawls’s thought as a shift from the 
“evangelical” liberal Protestantism of his youth to an ever more 
“irenic” form.  But notice that, as in Locke’s arguments, Rawls’s 
vision of separation in his later works was also supplemented 
institutionally by an irenic liberal establishment, based not in 
churches, but in universities and within the legal profession.  As 
guardians of public reason, this liberal establishment would clearly 
have an important role to play in maintaining norms of civility and 
modeling the intellectual work of reconciliation for their co-
citizens—for example, by keeping religious arguments out of 
legislation and the courts.  
To return to the question motivating this Symposium: 
twentieth-century liberals like Rawls would strongly deny that 
America is a Christian nation.  Of course, Christians of many 
different denominations can and should be able to affirm the 
principles of justice as fairness underlying its secular and 
democratic political institutions from within their various 
theological worldviews; however, so should the adherents of any 
number of other reasonable comprehensive doctrines, religious and 
non-religious.237  Nevertheless, maintaining the “reasonableness” 
of these doctrines would seem to rely on the ongoing entrenchment 
of irenic liberalism within the culture of our legal, educational, and, 
indeed, religious institutions and their leadership.  Here, we find 
something like the informal moral establishment imagined by 
Locke—but one no longer limited exclusively to theists and other 
believers. 
CONCLUSION 
Contrary to modern expectations, the three pillars of the Anglo-
American liberal tradition surveyed here do not speak univocally 
when it comes to the issue of (dis)establishment.  In Rawls, as in 
Locke, one finds nothing like Williams’s society of sects.  While 
236. See Bejan, supra note 24, at 144.
237. See generally, ANDREW F. MARCH, ISLAM AND LIBERAL CITIZENSHIP: THE
SEARCH FOR AN OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS (2009). 
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political liberalism on the Rawlsian model continues to presuppose 
the inadvertent establishment of evangelical Protestantism as a 
matter of law, it embraces Locke’s irenic establishmentarian 
impulse as a matter of jurisprudential and academic culture.  On 
this model, the state can maintain its formal separation from 
religion, while a cultural establishment of university-trained jurists 
and intellectuals sees to it, with public support, that the desired 
separation between religious and civil communities is maintained.  
That American democracy and jurisprudence do not work this 
way in practice is, again, beside the point for political theorists like 
myself.  The theory works well enough, and it continues to be taught 
in elite educational institutions across the world.  And so, while I 
agree with Cecile Laborde in her response to liberalism’s critics that 
liberalism itself is not a religion, I nevertheless believe that 
liberalism can and does function sometimes as an established 
church.  On this view, liberal egalitarians like Rawls and Laborde 
herself are not so much “rootless” but emphatically rooted 
cosmopolitans, whose parish is not bounded geographically, but 
rather intellectually and institutionally through shared sacred 
texts (both the American Bill of Rights and the European 
Convention on Human Rights) and elite academic institutions. 
These (primarily Anglophone) universities credential the young 
people who populate international institutions and preach the 
virtues of an individualistic ethos that valorizes conscientious 
dissent—while nonetheless seeking to preserve and reproduce a 
dominant, liberal democratic consensus for individuals to dissent 
from.  Within this informal cultural establishment, dissent (of the 
right kind) is admirable, as well as permissible.  So long, that is, as 
it knows its place. 
Little wonder, then, that Christians and conservatives 
complain vociferously today about the “liberal establishment” in 
America, whether in the law, the media, the arts, or above all the 
universities.  As I have shown in this essay, university politics have 
long played a major part in the politics of religious establishment; 
why shouldn’t the same be true today?  In these and other 
controversies, one hears definite echoes of early modern debates, 
reflecting our ongoing—and perhaps inescapable—intellectual 
entanglement with the establishmentarian presuppositions that 
produced our American culture of dissent. 
As for my own answer to the question at hand: Is America a 
Christian Nation?  I say, yes and no.  To this day, America has an 
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established religion in the evangelical and sectarian legal regime 
bequeathed to us by radical dissenters like Roger Williams and 
others of his ilk.  It remains to be seen, however, whether the 
informal establishment of liberal jurists, academics, and 
intellectuals envisioned by Locke and Rawls can withstand the 
rising pressure from critics on the Right—and increasingly, on the 
Left—and maintain its social, cultural, and political privileges as 
the clerical elite in our established church. 
